Market Intermediation, Publicness, and Securities Class Actions by Sale, Hillary A. & Thompson, Robert B.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 93 
Issue 2 New Directions for Corporate and Securities Litigation 
2015 
Market Intermediation, Publicness, and Securities Class Actions 
Hillary A. Sale 
Washington University School of Law 
Robert B. Thompson 
Georgetown University Law Center 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hillary A. Sale and Robert B. Thompson, Market Intermediation, Publicness, and Securities Class Actions, 
93 WASH. U. L. REV. 487 (2015). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/13 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
487 
MARKET INTERMEDIATION, PUBLICNESS, AND 
SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS  
HILLARY A. SALE 
ROBERT B. THOMPSON 
ABSTRACT 
Securities class actions play a crucial, if contested, role in the policing 
of securities fraud and the protection of securities markets. The theoretical 
understanding of these private enforcement claims needs to evolve to 
encompass the broader set of goals that underlie the securities regulatory 
impulse and the publicness of those goals. Further, a clear grasp of the 
modern securities class action also requires an updated understanding of 
how the role of market intermediation in securities transactions has 
reshaped the realities of securities litigation in public companies and the 
evolution of the fraud cause of action in the context of open-market 
transactions. The Supreme Court’s embrace of market efficiency as a 
mechanism to establish reliance in its 1988 decision, Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson, illustrates the necessary adaptation of common-law fraud to the 
modern market setting, and congressional enactment of the PSLRA in 
1995 exemplifies the efforts to respond to the litigation risks inherent in 
that adaptation. Together, Basic and the PSLRA provide a framework for 
understanding both a series of recent Supreme Court decisions on 
securities class actions and a different understanding of the theory 
undergirding those class actions. To develop this understanding, we 
expand the conversation about the goals of securities regulation to include 
the set of goals that are rooted in publicness and focus on market 
protection, innovation, and growth, as well as stability and systemic 
considerations. We posit that this broader theoretical understanding 
explains why the Court rejected a challenge to the fraud-on-the-market 
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doctrine and, instead, permitted the continued use of market efficiency: the 
Court chose to preserve the deterrence and enforcement role of these 
cases in promoting market growth and innovation. We then apply this 
understanding of publicness and market intermediation to the 
interpretation of the Court’s limited, but ambiguous, use of “price 
impact” in securities-fraud cases. Our analysis reveals that the practical 
balance established by Basic and the PSLRA has prevailed over pure 
doctrinal approaches to issues like reliance or other, more incomplete, 
theoretical explanations focused solely on compensation, deterrence, and 
investor protection, but neglects the role of publicness in the securities 
markets. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The legitimacy and efficacy of Rule 10b-5
1
 and the use of class actions 
to enforce it have been debated at great length. The initial judicial focus on 
the implication of a private right of action gave way to contests over the 
meaning of the elements of common-law fraud and other prerequisites 
necessary to prove the cause of action.
2
 The seesaw pattern of the cases in 
the first half-century of federal securities laws were enough to give a 
reader whiplash.
3
 Later congressional and judicial action, such as the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), inserted 
procedural hurdles to contain litigation agency costs and provided 
openings to vigorous contests over which elements of fraud are ripe for 
decision at early points in the litigation cycle.
4
 Over time, the fact of the 
10b-5 cause of action has become more clear and permanent, but the 
 
 
 1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016) (prohibiting fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a 
security). 
 2. See A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law and the New Deal Justices, 95 
VA. L. REV. 841, 894 (2009). 
 3. An initial long stretch of expansive holdings by the Supreme Court gave way to a seemingly 
unbroken run of restrictive opinions. See E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, The Supreme 
Court and Private Law: The Vanishing Importance of Securities and Antitrust, 53 EMORY L.J. 1571 
(2004) (showing expansive decisions from the late 1930s through the early 1970s and then twenty-four 
restrictive decisions and one expansive decision in the 1970s and 1980s after Justices Powell and 
Rehnquist joined the Court); see also A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the 
Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841 (2003) (tracing the change from 
expansive to restrictive decisions to the influence of Justice Lewis Powell, appearing upon his arrival 
and disappearing with his retirement).  
 4. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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interpretation of it has become more opaque and procedurally focused.
5
 A 
series of post-2010 US Supreme Court cases focused on how much of the 
10b-5 cause of action is fair game at the class-certification phase of the 
litigation.
6
 In doing so, they illustrate the turn to procedure and the 
complexity and confusion that have come with it, while reaffirming the 
Court’s commitment to the securities class action as an enforcement and 
deterrence mechanism.  
But it was not just the law that changed; there were fundamental 
changes in the role of markets in securities transactions. The expanding 
role of market intermediation in securities transactions is important to 
understanding the evolution of the common-law tort of deceit into today’s 
fraud-on-the-market-based 10b-5 class action, as well as to the specific 
issue of price impact. First, as the Supreme Court said in Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson, the market is an unpaid agent of the investors in modern 
securities transactions.
7
 By adopting the fraud-on-the-market presumption, 
it recognized that the necessary connection between defendants’ 
misrepresentations and plaintiffs’ loss can be shown when, in an efficient 
market, the fraud is incorporated into the market price of a security and 
thereby impacts the investors’ decision to buy or sell stock.8 In doing so, 
the Court acknowledged the role of the market as an impersonal 
intermediary in the transmission of information in today’s securities 
transactions. Second, modern financial learning, including, for example, 
diversification and portfolio theory, tells us that most shareholders own 
only a small percentage in any particular company and, thus, have little 
reason to be active investors, including, for example, suing when there is 
fraud.
9
 The class action mechanism brings efficiencies to this setting and, 
as the Court has recognized, is practically the only way private actions are 
likely to be brought, providing an enforcement mechanism for securities 
regulations and, thereby, acting as a deterrant to wrongdoers.  
 
 
 5. John C. Coates IV, Securities Litigation in the Roberts Court: An Early Assessment, 57 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 1 (2015). 
 6. Those cases pushed two fraud elements—materiality and loss causation—out of the class-
certification phase and reaffirmed the Court’s pathbreaking Basic Inc. v. Levinson decision, published 
a quarter-century earlier, which embraced theories of market efficiency as the basis for a presumption 
of the reliance element of fraud. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 7. Basic, 485 U.S. at 244 (citing one of the early fraud-on-the-market cases, In re LTV Sec. 
Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980)). That opinion, written by Patrick Higginbotham, later a 
judge on the Fifth Circuit, also discussed “the market’s role as a transmission belt” for information. 
LTV, 88 F.R.D. at 143. 
 8. Basic, 485 U.S. at 246–47.  
 9. See infra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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These legal developments and the new market realities have combined 
to poke holes in traditional theories for private enforcement. Diversified 
investors, particularly those following more passive investment strategies 
of relying on the market, may seem just as likely to be hurt by private 
fraud suits (as their portfolio companies pay the costs of the litigation) as 
to benefit on the receiving end of those suits. Further, the law of the 10b-5 
claim has lost any coherent connection to the traditional tort-based 
compensation rationale, and more generally, the case law has made a hash 
of the 10b-5 jurisprudence.
10
 
This Article develops a better theoretical understanding of these issues. 
In Part I, we focus on the Rule 10b-5 cause of action and its foundation in 
common-law fraud. The 10b-5 claim is ripe for confusion. Its fraud base 
means there are as many as eight elements the plaintiff must separately 
prove to prevail and an equal number of places where the defendant can 
mount an attack.
11
 A judicial tendency to conflate the elements and their 
proof—for example, materiality with reliance, or reliance with loss 
causation—exacerbates the mess.12 Further, the interaction of two key 
temporal dimensions of the 10b-5 claim adds to the complexity: 
(1) The front end and back end of litigation (i.e., matters to be 
addressed in pretrial motions versus those left to trial). Congress has 
chosen to move judicial review forward for some, but not all, of the 
elements that make up a Rule 10b-5 claim so that parties have 
ample incentive to characterize their claims to fit the procedural 
setting most favorable to their case. 
(2) The front end and back end of a fraud. The nature of fraud is 
that there seemingly is a temporal division between when 
defendant’s misrepresentation and plaintiff’s reliance on it occur 
and when plaintiff’s injury is ordinarily realized and measureable. 
This line turns out to be less real in a class action context, but has 
been subject to recurring battles in the class certification setting.
13
 
 
 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
 11. See infra Part I for a discussion of the common-law elements of fraud. 
 12. See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1212 (2013) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing the Amgen majority “conflat[ed] the doctrinally independent (and 
distinct) elements of materiality and reliance”); Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, 
Inc., 487 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007) (conflating loss causation with reliance), abrogated by Erica P. John 
Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011). 
 13. Jill Fisch has very effectively addressed the temporal confusion between ex ante price 
distortion and ex post price impact. Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion after 
Halliburton, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 895, 899, 921, 924 (2013). Don Langevoort likewise has pointed to 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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As to the first, defendants’ natural inclination is to push issues forward to 
the earlier stages of litigation, where procedure reigns over substance.
14
 In 
three cases before the Supreme Court since 2010, defendants sought to 
require the plaintiffs to prove three of the substantive elements of the 
10b-5 cause of action—materiality, reliance, and loss causation—as a 
condition to class certification.
15
 The defense bar has pressed the Court to 
accept that elements that might otherwise be subject to proof only at trial 
should be proved earlier in the litigation, thereby preventing a trial. The 
defendants came up short in each case, but those cases shifted the judicial 
focus to yet another issue: price impact. Defendants are now using the 
price impact element to contest reliance during the class-certification 
phase. We explore that debate later in the Article by examining its place in 
the larger theoretical debate about securities class actions.
16
 We also 
discuss another key element of the class action, reliance, which is very 
 
 
the conflation of reliance and loss causation. Donald C. Langevoort, Judgment Day for Fraud-on-the-
Market: Reflections on Amgen and the Second Coming of Halliburton, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 37 (2015). 
 14. The PSLRA permits defendants to bring a motion to dismiss as to scienter and 
misrepresentation prior to any discovery, increasing opportunities for defendants to take advantage of 
the procedural settings at the front end of litigation. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3) (2014). One study showed that almost 40 percent of cases are dismissed at the 
motion-to-dismiss stage. Michael Klausner & Jason Hegland, When Are Securities Class Actions 
Dismissed, When Do They Settle, and for How Much?—Part II, PLUS J. REPRINT, Mar. 2010, at 1, 
available at http://plusweb.org/Portals/0/Event%20Material/When%20Are%20Securities%20Class %20 
Actions%20Dismissed,%20When,%20and%20For%20How%20Much%20-%20Part%202.pdf; Michael 
Klausner et al., When Are Securities Class Actions Dismissed, When Do They Settle, and for How 
Much?—An Update 1, 3 (Stanford Law Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law and Econ., Working Paper 
No. 445, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2260831 (studying all securities class actions 
filed between 2006 and 2010 showing that “38% of cases ended relatively quickly and painlessly for 
the defendants”). Yet, cases that do survive the motion to dismiss have higher settlement value, thus 
increasing the pressure on defendants to settle the case, or, alternatively, increasing their incentive to 
find another way to eliminate the case procedurally prior to discovery or trial. See Klausner et al., 
supra, at 9–10. Additional sources show that between 1996 and 2013, about 41 percent of cases were 
dismissed at the motion-to-dismiss stage. CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION 
FILINGS: 2014 YEAR IN REVIEW 12 (2014), available at https://www.cornerstone.com/Get Attachment/ 
52bfaa16-ff84-43b9-b7e7-8b2c7ab6df43/Securities-Class-Action-Filings-2014-Year-in-Review.pdf.  
 15. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) 
(reliance); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013) (materiality); Erica 
P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I), 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011) (loss causation). 
 16. Price impact is not yet well understood, and the confusion is due, at least in part, to the 
confusion surrounding the second temporal dimension—the difference between the front and back end 
of fraud. In short, the defendants’ misrepresentation and plaintiffs’ reliance on it would typically occur 
at Time 1, or at the beginning of the class period, but the plaintiffs’ injury is typically realized and 
usually measured with regard to facts available later, at, for example, Time 2, after the fraud is 
revealed. It is, in fact, endemic to fraud that investors do not know about it at the front end. As the 
Supreme Court pointed out in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, at the time of the purchase or 
sale, the investor has not yet sustained an economic loss that would give rise to recovery, nor can 
damages be effectively measured. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–43 (2005).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/13
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different in open-market, anonymous transactions than in traditional face-
to-face encounters.
17
  
In Part II, we explore the arguments and tensions surrounding the use 
of the class action to pursue open-market transaction claims and how the 
securities version of fraud has necessarily developed differently from its 
common-law cousin. In Part III, we trace the key recent Supreme Court 
decisions that have produced the emerging jurisprudence on class actions 
more generally and on price impact in particular. These cases, when read 
together, reveal how the focus on the “science” of market efficiency, 
combined with a ratcheting up in procedural battles, has created layers of 
litigation that are both muddled and problematic. The result is a 
diminished and impoverished understanding of the substance of fraud, 
which harms both investors and corporate decisionmakers, who often have 
to make reporting decisions in rapid fashion.  
Part IV turns to the theoretical understanding of securities class actions 
more generally, expanding the discussion from investor-based 
justifications to a view of the class action as part of the larger securities 
regulatory impulse. To do so, we expand the discussion of the goals of 
securities regulation to include those that are focused on creating strong, 
healthy markets that enable capital allocation, growth, and innovation. 
These goals, along with those focused on systemic risk and stability, are a 
part of the securities regulatory structure that has its home in publicness, 
the space outside of the private focus on transactions between sellers and 
purchasers that takes into account the broader effect on citizens at large. 
Publicness in the more general sense reflects what society demands of 
powerful institutions, in terms of transparency, accountability, and 
openness, in order for that power to be legitimate.
18
 The specific 
 
 
 17. Two traditional elements of common-law fraud—reliance and loss causation—correspond to 
these two time periods (Time 1 and Time 2). Reliance (transaction causation or but-for causation) 
focuses on the connection between the plaintiff’s harm and the defendant’s wrongful conduct at Time 
1. There cannot be a cause of action, even for a misrepresentation that is material and made with the 
requisite mental state, if there is not a sufficient connection to the plaintiff’s harm. A traditional 
phrasing would sound something like this, “I heard your misrepresentation and in response changed 
my conduct.” List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965) (asking whether the 
“plaintiff would have been influenced to act differently than he did act if the defendant had disclosed 
to him the undisclosed fact”). In contrast, loss causation describes the connection at the back end, after 
the fraud has been revealed. A plaintiff who has relied on the defendant’s wrongful conduct cannot 
recover unless the loss is properly attributed to the fraud. This loss-causation link addresses the fact 
that in open-market securities-fraud cases, the question has been how to sort out the change in value 
properly attributed to the fraud from the changes due to other, often constant, market-price changes. 
 18. We and others have discussed the term “publicness.” See Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. 
Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 
337 (2013); Hillary A. Sale, J.P. Morgan: An Anatomy of Corporate Publicness, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 
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application here encompasses the idea that over time, the motivations for 
securities regulation have expanded well beyond individual investors and 
their relationship to the financial markets to include the impact of those 
markets on society and citizens more broadly.
19
 Congress and the Supreme 
Court recognize class actions as an accepted part of American securities 
regulation, and we argue that publicness and the market- and citizen-
focused goals of securities regulation support that recognition. As a result, 
we argue, securities-fraud class actions are necessarily different from 
traditional common-law fraud and will have correspondingly different 
risks of, for example, overcompensation.
20
 
In this Part, we identify a third temporal dimension that is important to 
our argument—the front end and back end of the regulation of securities. 
The front end is the familiar disclosure regime that is the recurring focus 
of American securities regulation, and the back end is the antifraud 
enforcement that Rule 10b-5 provides. Market efficiency and 
intermediation play a role in both facilitating securities offerings and 
enabling the class action that helps support the deterrence and enforcement 
necessary to create strong and healthy markets. This is the space in which 
securities regulation and market intermediation meet publicness and where 
the scope of the traditional theory of class actions necessarily expands. 
Interestingly, however, the result is that the space for arguing about 
reliance then contracts. We illustrate this result by applying this 
publicness-based theory to the price-impact, class-certification context. 
We conclude that the resulting contraction reflects both the role of market 
intermediation in securities litigation that is consistent with market 
intermediation at the front end of securities regulation, as well as the 
 
 
1629 (2014); Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1012 (2013); Hillary A. 
Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137 (2011); see also Joan 
MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the 
Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879 (2011).  
 19. We develop publicness in this Article both in the context of market efficiency and the 
deterrent effect of class actions. What we used to view as a form of “private” regulation is in fact 
increasingly public in nature. Publicness impacts regulatory decisions as well as those of corporate 
actors, who, as a result of publicness, are subject to heightened accountability. The impact of corporate 
decisions on the markets resulting, for example, in the 2009 financial crisis, increases pressure on 
legislatures, regulators, and others to address, through the regulatory structure, the potential for further 
market shocks and recessions. In addition, in the context of securities litigation, publicness means that 
choices by corporate actors about what and how they communicate do not stop at the corporate door. 
 20. Both Congress and the Court have addressed this risk, for example, by permitting rebuttal to 
the presumption of reliance in Basic and by developing multiple requirements for securities-fraud class 
actions through the PSLRA. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 
109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 
U.S. 224 (1988). 
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importance of securities-fraud enforcement to the broader, publicness 
goals of market protection, innovation, growth, and stability and systemic 
risk.  
I. THE COMMON-LAW FOUNDATION OF SECTION 10(b) AND RULE 10b-5 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission have been the 
source of considerable academic commentary over the years. Although at 
one point there was a fight about whether the courts could “disimply” the 
private cause of action that had been implied by courts, congressional 
action in 1995 retained it, adding procedural hurdles to cabin its use in 
contexts seen as worrisome.
21
 Nevertheless, the 10b-5 cause of action and 
the cost of litigating it remain controversial.
22
  
Rule 10b-5 claims have multiple elements, almost all with roots in the 
common law. In the end, if a case goes to trial (and very few do), the 
Supreme Court has provided the following list of elements that the 
plaintiffs must prove: 
1. a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant(s); 
2. scienter; 
3. a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the 
purchase or sale of a security; 
4. reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; 
5. economic loss; and  
6. loss causation.
23
 
The Supreme Court’s list, not surprisingly, reflects the long-standing 
elements of common-law fraud; the black-letter elements of the tort of 
deceit are basically the same. Private recovery for deceit can occur if there 
is:  
 
 
 21. See generally Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. 
 22. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 13.  
 23. This list originates in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005). It 
also appears in a somewhat shortened form in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008), Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1317–
18 (2011), Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011), Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans 
and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191–92 (2013), and Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2418 n.1 
(2014). 
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1. a defendant’s misrepresentation of 
2. a material  
3. fact  
4. done with scienter  
5. on which plaintiff relies  
6. suffering damages as a consequence.
24 
 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has said repeatedly that the securities statutes 
explicitly draw on common law, sometimes phrasing it as expanding on 
common-law fraud and other times adapting the common-law fraud.
25
  
Rule 10b-5’s language, as promulgated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in 1942, included the first three specific elements from 
common-law fraud—misrepresentation of a material fact.26 The elements 
of scienter, reliance, economic loss, and loss causation were omitted—not 
surprising for a rule originally adopted in an afternoon to empower the 
government to go after fraudsters.
27
 When courts later decided that the 
same policy and rule would permit private causes of action, it was also not 
a surprise that they looked to common-law fraud to fill out the 
requirements of scienter, reliance, and loss causation.
28
 Plaintiffs must 
prove all of the elements to recover. 
The Court’s list of the elements, which comes from a 2005 Supreme 
Court opinion, Dura Pharmaceuticals, has contributed to the confusion 
around these claims.
29
 For example, it combines two elements—
 
 
 24. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 105 (4th ed. 1971). This source 
does not break out materiality in a separate heading, but discusses it within misrepresentation. Id. 
§ 106. 
 25. Compare Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 341 (noting that a Rule 10b-5 claim “resembles, but is 
not identical to,” a common-law tort action for deceit), with Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 
U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (stating that “an important purpose of the federal securities statutes was to rectify 
perceived deficiencies in the available common law protections by establishing higher standards of 
conduct in the securities industry”); see also Basic, 485 U.S. at 244 n.22 (stating that Rule 10b-5 
actions are “in part designed to add to the protections provided investors by the common law”). 
 Section 11 of the 1933 Act is framed against this same template of the elements of common-law 
fraud, but it relaxes the requirements for reliance, changes the burden of proof for loss causation, and 
does both for scienter. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2014). Section 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act adopts a different 
combination of these same elements, id. § 77l(a)(2), and Section 18 of the 1934 Act provides yet a 
different combination that includes a double reliance requirement, id. § 78r. 
 26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016). 
 27. Milton V. Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 BUS. LAW. 891, 922 (1967). 
 28. See, e.g., Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514–15 (E.D. Pa. 1946).  
 29. Dura’s addition of economic loss to the list has also been criticized as not following from 
common-law deceit precedents. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Fraud-on-the-
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materiality and misrepresentation—that common law and prior Supreme 
Court opinions have recognized as separate.
30
 There are many material 
facts that shareholders would want to know, but unless the corporation or a 
person associated with it has an obligation to disclose information, the 
failure to do so is not a misrepresentation (by omission), and, therefore, no 
10b-5 claim arises.
31
 The list also omits entirely the requirement that the 
material misrepresentation be as to a fact (as opposed to an opinion), a 
context that generated the Court’s most recent securities opinion.32 
Further, the Court drops into the middle of its list of common-law fraud 
elements the requirement that the misrepresentation be in connection with 
the purchase or sale of a security.
33
 These words, drawn from similar 
language in the Securities Act, reflect the New Deal desire to provide a 
federal claim for common-law fraud cases occurring in securities markets 
for which state law had proven inadequate.
34
  
As our first step in clarifying the 10b-5 cause of action and aspects of 
its proof, then, we suggest that the Court’s framework in Dura causes 
unnecessary confusion. Rather than continuing to rely on the Dura list, we 
propose a reframing of the elements organized around:  
1. the defendants’ prohibited conduct;  
2. the plaintiffs’ harm;  
3. the connection between the conduct and the harm; and  
4. the link to a securities transaction. 
The two elements that make up the requisite “connection” are core to this 
Article, and both are sometimes denoted as causation. The reliance 
element provides a front-end link between the plaintiffs’ purchase or sale 
 
 
Market Tort, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1755, 1768, 1773 (2013) (damage understood as a prudential filter by 
which judges have excluded certain well-founded but trivial deceit claims; this requirement “dissipates 
(or, perhaps, disappears)” when plaintiff only seeks relief based on rescission or unjust enrichment; 
because courts have understood damages as a pragmatic filter, they have not insisted on the exacting 
conception of economic loss invoked by Dura). 
 30. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (distinguishing materiality—addressed in 
that case—from duty to disclose, an element of misrepresentation). 
 31. Gallagher v. Abbott Labs., 269 F.3d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 2001) (“We do not have a system of 
continuous disclosure. Instead firms are entitled to keep silent (about good news as well as bad news) 
unless positive law creates a duty to disclose.”).  
 32. Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318, 
1327–29 (2015) (distinguishing opinion from facts that can be misleading in the context of a Section 
11 (not Rule 10b-5) action, but finding that statement of opinion qualifies as misleading statement if 
opinion expressed was not sincerely believed).  
 33. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005). 
 34. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 12, 48 Stat. 74 (1933). 
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and the defendants’ prohibited conduct (Time 1). Reliance is sometimes 
referred to as transaction, or but-for, causation. Loss causation, however, 
refers to a different connection usually measured at the back end and sorts 
out losses that can be attributed to the fraud from those that can be 
allocated to another source (Time 2). This element addresses the concern 
that market prices can move in response to factors other than the alleged 
misstatement or omission. For example, the market price of an individual 
security can fall in response to an overall decline in the market. Loss 
causation responds to the legal and policy concerns that the plaintiffs 
should not be insured against market changes.
35
 This element plays the 
intervening or proximate cause role that the Palsgraf case plays in 
traditional tort cases.
36
 Yet, in securities-fraud cases, the change in market 
price normally shows up after the fraud has been revealed; thus, loss 
causation seeks to disaggregate the loss, or to separate out the portion due 
to the fraud. Reliance and loss causation are, therefore, different from each 
other and, because of market intermediation, different in an open-market 
securities setting from that of the traditional common-law fraud claim. 
 
Common-Law 
Elements Relating to 
Defendant’s Conduct 
Common-Law 
Elements 
Relating to 
Plaintiff 
Common-Law Elements 
Defining Connection 
Between Defendants’ 
Wrongful Act & Plaintiffs’ 
Loss 
Necessary 
Connection to 
Securities 
1. Misrepresentation 
(includes a. affirmative 
lies; b. half-truths; or c. 
silence if there is a duty 
to speak) 
5. Plaintiff 
suffers harm 
(economic 
loss) 
6. Reliance (by plaintiff on 
defendant’s wrongful act, 
sometimes discussed as 
“transaction causation” or 
“but-for” causation or 
“causation in fact”) 
8. In 
connection 
with the 
purchase or 
sale of a 
security 
2. of a Material  7. Loss causation (sometimes 
discussed as proximate 
cause, and distinguishing 
loss from the fraud from loss 
from other sources, such as 
the market) 
 
3. Fact    
4. done with 
Scienter (a sufficiently 
bad mental state) 
   
 
 
 35. See Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. 
REV. 151, 181–84 (discussing the Dura Court’s analysis of loss causation); see also Jill E. Fisch, 
Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811 (2009) (discussing 
the Dura Court’s analysis of loss causation). 
 36. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
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II. SECURITIES-FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS  
Securities-fraud cases are different from the traditional common-law 
fraud case. Modern securities transactions often occur in public markets, 
not in face-to-face transactions. The common characteristics of markets 
and transactions mean that individual suits for fraud arising in this setting 
make little economic sense. Thus, securities-fraud cases usually occur as 
class actions, creating a different litigation context and the need for a 
different understanding of some of the elements, including, for example, 
reliance and damages.
37
  
A. Class Actions as a Response to the Economics of Individual 
Shareholders 
Securities-fraud litigation occurs largely in the class-action context, 
and the cases support an industry for both plaintiff- and defense-side 
lawyers.
38
 The class action mechanism addresses two key issues for open-
market securities-fraud claims arising in modern public corporations. The 
first is that the costs of litigating an individual securities-fraud claim 
exceed the holdings of most individual investors.
39
 Portfolio theory and 
investment patterns reveal that shares are dispersed among numerous 
shareholders, each owning a small percentage of a company’s stock. 
Indeed, most investors do not hold a significant number of shares in any 
given company.
40
 As a result, the cost of hiring a lawyer to pursue a fraud 
claim will likely quickly surpass the value of the typical individual stake 
in a public company, so that it is not worth an individual’s while to pay the 
costs of litigating a claim. In economic terms, these small investors have a 
collective-action problem. Their losses are too small to support litigation 
unless they join as a group or class.  
B. Class Actions and Litigation Agency Costs 
In addition to low incentives to sue due to the size of their claims, 
investors also have low incentives to monitor the class-action litigation 
 
 
 37. See, e.g., Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
 38. See Lynn A. Baker et al., Setting Attorneys’ Fees in Securities Class Actions: An Empirical 
Assessment, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1677, 1678–80 (2013). 
 39. See id. at 1679.  
 40. Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 
536 n.21 (1997). 
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that may be brought on their behalf.
41
 As a result, the plaintiffs’ lawyers 
play a very significant role in these cases. They take the cases on 
contingency and manage the litigation in consultation with representative 
plaintiffs. Because of the contingency aspect, the lawyers also assume the 
risk of any loss, including the cost of cases that do not result in 
settlement.
42
 When these cases do settle, there are often substantial fees to 
the lawyers and, when spread across the class, relatively small recoveries 
for individual plaintiffs. Opponents argue that many of these cases amount 
to little more than strike suits.
43
 The litigation is frequently described as 
vexatious.
44
 Others have argued that the plaintiffs’ bar brings cases simply 
to extract unwarranted settlements, and that the cases can harm the 
reputation of the defendants. This, opponents argue, results in high 
opportunity and transaction costs from the litigation.
45
 Some claims are 
difficult to sort out,
46
 and, whether or not the fraud occurred, litigation 
takes time away from executives running the business. 
Proponents of private class actions, however, argue that the cases are 
key to deterrence and, therefore, enforcement of the securities regulations, 
and that they support the scarce resources of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.
47
 In this view, plaintiffs’ lawyers act as private attorneys 
general, enforcing the fraud prohibitions and, thereby, promoting the goals 
of fair and efficient markets that, as we explore in Part IV, are tied to 
publicness, innovation, growth, and stability. This private-attorneys-
general view is particularly important when considered in light of the 
relatively small holdings of the average plaintiff and the resulting lack of 
incentive for a small investor to bring the cases on his or her own.
48
 
C.  The Role of Insurance 
The power of the litigation is increased by the fact that, for the 
defendants, the consequences of litigating and losing are very high. 
 
 
 41. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative 
Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1758 (2004) (discussing litigation agency costs). 
 42. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 40, at 554. 
 43. See Brief for Petitioners at 42–43, Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317). 
 44. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975). 
 45. Eric Helland, Reputational Penalties and the Merits of Class-Action Securities Litigation, 49 
J.L. & ECON. 365, 375–78 (2006). 
 46. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 742 (noting that oral claims in securities cases can be hard to 
sort out). 
 47. William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It Matters, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2148–54 (2004). 
 48. For a summary of the debates on these issues and a discussion of research on the topic, see 
generally Fisch, supra note 40. 
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Defendants found liable for fraud lose their directors’ and officers’ 
insurance coverage and their indemnification.
49
 Further, the damages, 
which would be personal at that point, are potentially very large.
50
 This 
looming shadow of liability (at the back end) arguably adds to the (front-
end) value of the claim and increases its strike and settlement value. For 
those reasons and many others, including the mixed incentives of both the 
defense- and plaintiff-side lawyers, these cases rarely go to trial. Instead, 
they are resolved by settlement, after litigation focused on motions and 
procedural arguments, and with little attention to actual facts or 
evidence.
51
 Insurance policies cover the settlement costs, including fees for 
plaintiffs’ counsel, as well as paying the defense-lawyer fees along the 
way. Thus, insurance policies, with their exclusions for fraud and bad 
faith, play a role in the incentive to settle and the amount of money 
available for settlement. 
D. Causation and Impersonal Market Transactions 
The common law of fraud requires each injured person to have relied 
on the misstatement or omission in order to prove her claim.
52
 Yet, in 
publicly-held corporations, the interactions supporting these fraud claims 
are trades in impersonal markets and thus are unlike the traditional 
relationship-based fraud of the common-law fraud setting. The market acts 
as an intermediary. Further, the class-action rules that cover typical 
securities litigation require that class member claims be sufficiently 
similar, addressed with a standard that focuses on whether “questions of 
law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members.”53 Combining the impersonal nature of 
 
 
 49. They also suffer reputational harm, though that harm may well be more perceived than 
actual. See Helland, supra note 45, at 365.  
 50. See Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC’s Fair 
Fund Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 372 (2015) (discussing the average recovery and aggregate 
damages in securities class actions); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal 
Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611 (1985). 
 51. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities 
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991); Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and 
Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 896 (1992) (noting that 
the potential for “substantial overcompensation” influences the parties’ “bargaining dynamics 
associated with pre-trial settlement”). 
 52. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014) (quoting Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & 
Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192 (2013)) (“To recover damages for violations of section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b–5, a plaintiff must prove . . . ‘reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission . . . .’”). 
 53. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
502 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:487 
 
 
 
 
the transaction with the class action, then, results in the need to adjust the 
common law, and in particular, the reliance element.  
Consider the following example. If all investors were Warren Buffett, 
they would be able to prove their reliance on a defendant’s misstatement 
or omission, because they would read the company’s offering documents, 
quarterly reports, or annual reports. Those investors would be well 
informed and up to date on the company’s changes in management, 
product lines, and strategies—at least those that were made public.54  
Investors, however, trade for multiple reasons and with varying degrees 
of information. Indeed, unlike Warren Buffett, small investors are less 
likely to read all or any of a company’s filings.55 Their reliance is not 
directly on company documents or statements, but is, instead, indirectly on 
those filings as interpreted by analysts or brokers and others who translate 
the information to the market.
56
 As a result, an insistence on maintaining 
reliance as developed at common law would defeat the use of the class 
action and eliminate the enforcement it brings. It is for this reason that, in 
1988, the Supreme Court recognized the fraud-on-the-market doctrine in 
the now famous case of Basic Inc. v. Levinson.
57
 In Basic, the Court 
defined the requisite connection between a defendant’s wrongful act and 
plaintiffs’ harm, noted that there is more than one way to demonstrate that 
connection, and decided that the 10b-5 version of fraud must account for 
the difference between modern securities-markets transactions and their 
common-law, face-to-face counterparts.
58
 Applying these principles, the 
Court held that as long as the securities trade in an efficient market, all 
investors—both Warren Buffett and the small investor—can be presumed 
to have relied on the market price as a reflection of the value of a share.
59
 
This is where market intermediation comes into play. In short, the theory 
is that if the market is efficient—a term about which there is considerable 
debate—public information about the company will be impounded into the 
 
 
 54. Of course, if all investors were like Warren Buffet, they would have relatively large holdings 
in companies, making it worth their while to sue. 
 55. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. 
REV. 549, 569 (1984). 
 56. Id.  
 57. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243–45 (1988) (stating that “our understanding of Rule 
10b-5’s reliance requirement must encompass” the differences between “modern securities markets, 
literally involving millions of shares changing hands daily” and “face-to-face transactions 
contemplated by early fraud cases,” and “[r]equiring a plaintiff to show a speculative state of facts . . . 
would place an unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary burden on the Rule 10b-5 plaintiff who has traded 
on an impersonal market”). 
 58.  Id. at 241–50. 
 59. Id. at 246–50. 
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stock price. Thus, when an investor or that investor’s retirement fund buys 
the securities at the market price, the price reflects the information—true 
or false. The presumption is that public, material misrepresentations can 
distort the price of stock traded in an efficient market, and, as a result, 
purchasers in that market may be considered to have done so in reliance on 
the misrepresentation. To be sure, this form of reliance is only a 
presumption and is subject to rebuttal.
60
 
This theory of market efficiency, or market intermediation, acts as a 
proxy, so to speak, for reliance as traditionally required for face-to-face 
transactions. It was controversial when adopted in Basic, and it has been 
debated ever since—both in the legal61 and the economic literature.62 
Nevertheless, it provided the commonality necessary for class actions and, 
as we will explore in Part III, prompted a trio of recent Supreme Court 
cases, one of which affirmed both the presumption and its importance.  
A second element affected by the open-market setting is the calculation 
of damages. The usual method has been to use an event study that 
measures the change in the price at the time of correction of the fraud, or 
Time 2, as a proxy for how much inflation occurred at the time of the 
misstatement, or Time 1.
63
 This delta is generally referred to as the price 
impact of the fraud, and much of what we know about its measure has 
occurred in the context of damage and loss-causation measurement.  
In theory, the value of the fraud could be measureable at the front 
end—at the time defendant makes the misrepresentation and plaintiffs 
enter into the securities transaction. The goal would be to measure the out-
of-pocket harm to the security holder, or the difference between the value 
the stock was represented to have and its actual value at the time of the 
transaction. But that turns out to be somewhat difficult to measure. The 
price at the time of transactions is available, but if it incorporates the 
 
 
 60. Id. at 248–49 (giving three examples of when the presumption might be rebutted: (1) where 
“market makers” are already privy to the information conveyed by the defendant; (2) where credible 
countervailing information enters the market and dissipates the effect of the fraud; and (3) where 
plaintiffs would have sold without relying on the integrity of the market (i.e., if motivated by concerns 
unrelated to the fraud). This combination of rationales applicable to all investors and only to one 
investor creates some conceptual problems that have plagued later efforts to coherently describe the 
theoretical basis for the presumption and its rebuttal. See infra text accompanying notes 169–90. 
 61. See generally Roberta S. Karmel, When Should Investor Reliance Be Presumed in Securities 
Class Actions?, 63 BUS. LAW. 25 (2007); Fisch, supra note 13. 
 62. See Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on the Market Meets Behavioral Finance, 31 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 457–58 (2006); Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock 
Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135 (2002). 
 63. See Merritt B. Fox, Halliburton II: It All Depends on What Defendants Need to Show to 
Establish No Impact on Price, 70 BUS. LAW. 437 (2015) (discussing event studies in securities 
litigation generally and in price-impact contexts more specifically). 
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fraud, it does not reflect the security’s true value. Economists, therefore, 
have focused on data that is more cacheable as a proxy for that value, 
using information from the back end.
64
 They look at how much the price 
changed (i.e., dropped) when the fraud was revealed and use that as a 
measure for the value of the misrepresentation.
65
 The event study 
methodology aids in separating the price change attributable to the fraud 
from any other source, including particularly from the usual changes that 
occur in public markets.
66
 This work is that of the loss-causation element, 
which necessarily operates off data at the Time 2 point to make a 
conclusion about damages for the Time 1 fraud. Here is where the 
conflation between the two elements has occurred.
67
 As discussed below, 
it is hard to reconcile price impact in the context of reliance, or Time 1, 
with this Time 2 approach.  
E. PSLRA Provisions to Regulate Class Actions  
The arguments surrounding the costs and benefits of securities class 
actions formed the basis of a strong push for reform of the litigation of 
these claims, culminating in the PSLRA.
68
 The PSLRA contained a myriad 
of reforms to securities claims and litigation, most of which have played 
out procedurally and two of which provide the foundation for the most 
recent series of 10b-5 cases before the Supreme Court.
69
  
As noted above, scienter, or the defendants’ state of mind, is an 
element of a securities-fraud claim. Prior to the PSLRA, several courts had 
 
 
 64. Dunbar & Heller, supra note 62, at 508.  
 65. See Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1344 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., 
concurring) (reasoning that out-of-pocket measure, but not rescission, could be the basis for class 
certification, and describing how data between the date of misrepresentation and date of corrective 
disclosure can be arranged on a “price line” and “value line” to measure the effect of defendant’s 
wrong conduct at the time of the misrepresentation and the times afterwards). 
 66. See Esther Bruegger & Frederick C. Dunbar, Estimating Financial Fraud Damages with 
Response Coefficients, 35 J. CORP. L. 11, 12–13 (2009) (“The iconic status of the event study is due to 
what it replaced: expert opinion based on unsupported assertions about materiality and loss causation, 
and as inflation-per-share estimates drawn from little more than junk science.”); Fisch, supra note 13, 
at 918–22; Langevoort, supra note 35, at 180 n.127 (“To some extent at least, doubts about efficiency 
also call into question the precision of the event study itself, which often makes efficiency-driven 
assumptions in drawing the baseline against which observed returns are measured.”). 
 67. See Michael J. Kaufman, At a Loss: Congress, the Supreme Court and Causation Under the 
Federal Securities Laws, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 37–38 (2005).  
 68. See H.R. REP. NO. 104–369, at 31–32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (discussing the benefits and 
potential for abuse in securities class actions); Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 903, 915 n.57 (2002). 
 69. See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2426 (2014); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust 
Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013).  
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used Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to require that 10b-
5 claims be subjected to heightened pleading requirements.
70
 As to 
scienter, the PSLRA requires that plaintiffs plead with particularity facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required 
state of mind.
71
 This inquiry, of course, is very fact-based. As a result, 
although the standard is “uniform,” the outcomes will never be. Fights 
about this standard, and how courts should implement it, were the first 
wave of procedural litigation under the PSLRA.
72
 
The PSLRA also added a provision that stays discovery pending the 
outcome of a motion to dismiss.
73
 This provision works in tandem with the 
heightened pleading standard for scienter (and also for the 
misrepresentation element) to push plaintiffs to develop facts prior to 
filing their complaints in order to survive the motion to dismiss and pursue 
their claims.
74
 With respect to the strike suit/vexatious litigation argument 
summarized above in Part II.B, these provisions have also worked to 
decrease the settlement value of a complaint early in the litigation and 
have given defendants the opportunity to end potentially frivolous cases 
without having to sustain the costs of discovery.
75
 At the same time, a 
complaint that survives the motion to dismiss is one that has met a very 
 
 
 70. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 (2007). 
 71. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2014). While providing a heightened pleading standard, the statute 
does not identify the required state of mind, leaving that to be determined by the courts. See id. 
 72. See generally A.C. Pritchard & Hillary A. Sale, What Counts as Fraud? An Empirical Study 
of Motions to Dismiss Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 125, 130 (2005). 
 73. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). 
 74. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006) (stating that in 
order “to curb . . . perceived abuses” in class actions, Congress “authorize[ed] a stay of discovery 
pending resolution of any motion to dismiss”); see also SG Cowen Sec. Corp. v. U.S. Dist. Court for 
N. Dist. of Cal., 189 F.3d 909, 912–13 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (“The ‘Stay of Discovery’ provision of the Act clearly contemplates that discovery should be 
permitted in securities class actions only after the court has sustained the legal sufficiency of the 
complaint.”); Avenue Capital Mgmt. II, LP v. Schaden, Civil Action No. 14-cv-02031-PAB-KLM, 
2015 WL 758521, at *2 (D. Colo. Feb. 20, 2015) (quoting In re LaBranche Sec. Litig., 333 F. Supp. 2d 
178, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)) (“The legislative history of the PSLRA indicates that Congress enacted the 
discovery stay to prevent plaintiffs from filing securities class actions with the intent of using the 
discovery process to force a coercive settlement.”); Pension Trust Fund for Operating Eng’rs v. 
Assisted Living Concepts, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 2d 913, 914 (E.D. Wis. 2013) (“The purpose of this stay 
is to allow the Court to evaluate plaintiffs' claims in security actions before the defendant is required to 
engage in extensive and expensive discovery.”); In re Diamond Foods, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. C 11-
05386 WHA, 2012 WL 6000923, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012) (“[T]he consolidated complaint has 
sufficiently pled scienter and loss causation under the PSLRA . . . . The discovery stay is now lifted 
. . . .”). 
 75. Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of the 
PSLRA's Internal-Information Standard on '33 and '34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 537, 576–78 
(1998). 
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stringent pleading standard and has done so without access to documents 
or other discovery. For these cases, the settlement price tag likely has 
increased. Defendants could choose to settle those cases and move on, and 
in the early days, some did just that.
76
 Increasingly, however, defendants 
have been deploying additional procedural litigation tactics at other 
pretrial stages of the case.
77
 The goal here, like in employment and 
consumer-fraud cases, is to prevent the case from going to trial through the 
use of the class-certification process. 
F. Class-Certification Procedures in Securities Class Actions 
To understand the growth in the procedural issues raised by the defense 
bar, it is necessary to review the typical litigation path for these cases. 
After the initial step of filing a complaint, the litigation of one of these 
cases begins with a motion to dismiss, subject to the heightened pleading 
standard. The plaintiffs’ lawyers must meet the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss with very strong facts to support their case. Additionally, as 
mentioned above, they must do so without the aid of discovery.  
After the motion to dismiss, the parties can settle, or they can move on 
to discovery and trial. Increasingly, these cases face a second stage of 
procedural battles focused on class certification. Defendants have sought 
to bring a larger number of issues into the class-certification stage in an 
attempt to defeat certification, and, thereby, the case. In addition, during 
the class-certification battle, the defendants have argued that discovery 
should be limited solely to issues related to class certification.
78
  
At this stage, the focus, given Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), 
is whether common or individual issues predominate. The challenge has 
been to determine whether a particular fraud element of the claim is one 
that is key to predominance or, if not proved at trial, would result in the 
case’s failing for all plaintiffs alike. The defendants have fought 
aggressively at this stage, arguing that the plaintiffs need to prove, not 
plead, materiality, reliance, and loss causation at class certification and 
 
 
 76. Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes 
During the First Decade After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1498–99 (2006). 
 77. See generally JONATHAN C. DICKEY, SECURITIES LITIGATION: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 
(2013) (providing a practical guide, including many procedural tactics, for defending securities class-
action suits). 
 78. Before Halliburton I, discovery began after the motion to dismiss, limited to class 
certification. While Halliburton II was pending, cases began to move into general discovery. 
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before trial.
79
 In addition, defendants have argued that reliance as 
presumed by Basic should be proved, and not presumed, at class 
certification.
80
 
The Court has rejected almost all of these claims by defendants, but it 
has done so in ways that have prompted additional fights. Both 
Halliburton opinions are examples of the procedural nature of much of 
current litigation. The Halliburton defendants have now made two trips to 
the Supreme Court to argue about the various levels of proof required on 
two different elements of these claims.
81
 Both arguments involve the class-
certification stage, and the second round of litigation was prompted by the 
Court’s language in the first opinion.82 As a result, the case, which was 
filed in 2001, has not yet been tried or “proved,” and presumably, defense 
counsel have billed thousands of hours in litigation.
83
 
G. Class Actions and Theories About Securities Regulation 
Class actions have not only led to significant changes in the elements 
of the fraud, but also have disrupted the traditional tort-based theories used 
to support Rule 10b-5 claims. In particular, class actions challenge the 
compensatory rationale often given for tort claims like securities fraud. In 
the usual securities-fraud class-action setting, shareholders who were 
deceived, and therefore paid too much or too little, sue to recover their loss 
from the deceiver. A compensatory theory easily supports such a claim in 
a 1933 Securities Act setting, where the wrongdoer (the issuer and those 
working with it) is on the other side of the transaction from the investor 
and gains what the investor lost. In the typical setting under the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act, however, the wrongdoer is the company or its 
management, and usually neither buys nor sells shares as a counterparty to 
the investor. Rather, the company/insiders made the misleading statement, 
 
 
 79. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2412; Brief for Petitioners at 3-4, 17–18, 21, Halliburton II, 134 
S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317). 
 80. See, e.g., id. at 35–37. 
 81. See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2405–17 (considering whether defendants could rebut the 
Basic presumption with evidence of a lack of price impact at the class-certification stage); Halliburton 
I, 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011) (considering whether plaintiffs relying on the fraud-on-the-market theory to 
establish reliance were separately required to establish loss causation in order to obtain class 
certification). 
 82. See Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2187 (“Because we conclude the Court of Appeals erred by 
requiring EPJ Fund to prove loss causation at the certification stage, we need not, and do not, address 
any other question about Basic, its presumption, or how and when it may be rebutted.”). 
 83. The District Court granted class certification for one corrective disclosure and denied class 
status for five others in July 2015, referring to the “long and winding history of [the] matter.” See 
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. 251, 255 (N.D. Tex. 2015). 
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and the investor thereafter traded with a third party, who is not a defendant 
and gets to keep any gain.  
Tort law, of course, is amenable to making those who deceive pay for 
the harm even if they did not directly benefit. In the corporate setting, the 
result is that the corporate treasury will pay directly or indirectly by 
indemnifying directors and officers or paying the insurance that funds the 
settlement. Thus, circularity arises as funds go from one shareholder 
pocket (or one set of shareholders) to another shareholder pocket (or a 
somewhat different set of shareholders) after a substantial amount has 
been subtracted for attorneys’ fees and other transaction costs. 
Consequently, the compensation justification for recovery loses much of 
its force.  
The other traditional justification for fraud recovery, deterrence, fares 
better than compensation but triggers additional complications in the class-
action context. Although the individuals who make misleading corporate 
statements can be held personally liable, such that damages would likely 
be expected to deter their conduct, the reality is that payments from the 
company or its insurer diminish this direct form of deterrence/ 
enforcement. Instead, the deterrence/enforcement justification is much 
more indirect: if companies pay, it will make their officers and boards 
change their behavior, increase investor trust in the markets, and support 
the publicness goals of securities regulation. We return to these issues 
when we engage in the theoretical discussion of securities class actions, 
market intermediation, and publicness in Part IV. 
III. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY SUPREME COURT SECURITIES 
JURISPRUDENCE: MATERIALITY, RELIANCE, LOSS CAUSATION, AND PRICE 
IMPACT 
Four twenty-first century Supreme Court opinions are responsible for 
the current confusion over the use of price impact in proof of reliance and 
loss causation, and those cases share several common features.
84
 First, they 
illustrate narrow holdings that, like common-law cases generally, decide 
only the immediate case, putting off the larger issue for another day. Each 
issue and case unfolds from, and is connected to, the prior case, such that 
one needs to read them together to understand the Court’s current 
approach to 10b-5 and price impact. Further, the narrow holdings—and 
the Court’s loose language as to questions such as price impact—have 
 
 
 84. See generally Fisch, supra note 13. 
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given defendants (who lost the cases) room to continue to litigate, 
including bringing the same case, Halliburton, back to the Court.  
Second, these cases illustrate the current focus of 10b-5 litigation on 
the class-certification context. The Court has trimmed the scope of class-
certification arguments, holding that materiality and loss-causation 
questions are not appropriate, and that the presumption of reliance does 
apply. In the wake of those holdings, attention has shifted to another 
dimension arising at class certification: the narrowly-defined space for 
price impact left open by Halliburton II. 
Third, the cases reaffirm Basic’s foundation that class actions are a 
core part of securities regulation and, importantly, Basic’s conclusion that 
adaptations to the common law of reliance through market intermediation 
and the fraud-on-the-market presumption are necessary if class actions are 
to have the effective deterrence role the Court supports. 
A. The Four Cases 
Before delving into the four 10b-5 cases, a reminder about the front 
and back end of the claims is useful. As we noted earlier, common-law 
fraud requires a sufficient connection between a defendant’s wrongful act 
and a plaintiff’s loss. The defendant’s misrepresentation occurs at Time 1, 
and the plaintiff’s injury typically is realized at Time 2, when the fraud is 
revealed. The focus of reliance is at Time 1, the time of the transaction: 
did the plaintiff change his or her position in response to the 
misrepresentation? In contrast, the focus of loss causation, given the 
reality of how proof of damages occurs in modern securities markets, is 
usually later, at Time 2, when the truth is revealed. Demonstrating loss 
causation requires parsing the loss into the portion that can be attributed to 
the fraud and the portion allocated to other causes. In securities markets, 
where prices change regularly, that question is constant and complicated. 
The recent Supreme Court cases illustrate different aspects of the 
relationship between these two factors. 
1. Dura Pharmaceuticals: Pleading Front-End (Time 1) Facts Does 
Not Meet the Standard for Pleading Loss at the Back End (Time 2) 
We begin with Dura Pharmaceuticals,
85
 a case decided a few years 
before the three class-certification cases, and one that turned on the two 
distinct temporal dimensions inherent in fraud cases: Time 1, when the 
 
 
 85. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
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misrepresentation and reliance occur, and Time 2, when the truth is 
revealed and the effect of the fraud is actually felt. In Dura, the Supreme 
Court addressed the economic-loss and loss-causation elements in the 
context of a motion to dismiss.
86
 Put succinctly, the issue in the case was 
loss at Time 2, and plaintiff’s complaint addressed facts only for Time 1. 
The plaintiff pleaded price inflation due to the fraud.
87
 Necessarily, in any 
successful fraud case, price distortion occurs.
88
 That is what fraud does. 
There is not, however, always an injury, and a plaintiff must also show 
harm (loss) that can be attributed to the fraud as opposed to another cause. 
Harm and loss, however, are visible only later, at Time 2. 
For contextual purposes, the allegations in Dura were that the 
defendants had made misstatements about earnings and about expected 
FDA approval of an asthmatic spray device that was ultimately not 
approved.
89
 There was evidence of loss causation for the earnings claim, 
but that claim failed the scienter pleading standard at the motion-to-
dismiss stage, leaving only the FDA claim.
90
 Without getting into the facts 
of Dura in detail, the price movement of the stock was less than ideal for 
the plaintiffs’ purposes.91 With respect to the loss causation element, the 
plaintiffs alleged the following: “[i]n reliance on the integrity of the 
market, [the plaintiffs] . . . paid artificially inflated prices for Dura 
securities and the plaintiffs suffered damage[s] thereby.”92  
The defendants argued that this allegation was insufficient for the loss-
causation element, which requires a causal connection between the 
defendants’ alleged misrepresentations and the plaintiffs’ economic 
losses.
93
 After noting that the standard to be applied to the pleading of this 
 
 
 86. Id. at 339–46. 
 87. Fourth Consolidated Amended Complaint for Violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 at 73, In re Dura Pharms., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 99-CV-0151-L(WMC) (S.D. Cal. July 21, 2006), 
2006 WL 3267513. 
 88. Usually this would be inflation of value, but sometimes, as in Basic, the effect can be to 
lower the value of the stock, harming investors who sell at a deflated price. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 
U.S. 224, 227–29 (1988). 
 89. Fourth Consolidated Amended Complaint for Violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, supra note 87, at 10, 17–18. 
 90. Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 340 (describing the trial court’s dismissal of the drug-profitability 
claim because plaintiff had not adequately pleaded scienter).  
 91. There was a noticeable drop after disclosure of new earnings and ambiguous results after 
disclosures about the FDA action—but the lower court had disposed of the earnings claims on scienter 
grounds. In re Dura Pharms, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2001 WL 35925887, at *14–15 (S.D. Cal. 2001).  
 92. Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 339–40 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(alterations in original). 
 93. Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs’ Consolidated & Amended Complaint at 20–21, In re Dura Pharms., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 99 
CV 0151 JL JFS (S.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 1999), 1999 WL 33998677. 
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element was that of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a “short and 
plain statement” of the facts, the Court held that the complaint did not 
meet the test.
94
 Instead, the Court held that the plaintiffs needed to claim a 
connection between the misstatement or omission and their injury.
95
 In 
doing so, the Court pointed out that by definition, if the defendants are 
committing fraud, the harm does not occur at the point at which the 
plaintiffs buy the stock.
96
 At that point, Time 1, although the market price 
is presumably inflated or sustained by the fraud, the harm has not yet 
occurred. It occurs later, at Time 2, when the fraud is revealed, and the 
shares lose value. Thus, the plaintiffs needed to provide information about 
where the loss and harm occurred, subject to the Rule 8(a)(2) “short and 
plain statement” pleading standard. 
In reaching the holding, the Court set out the two bookend concerns 
characteristic of its current approach to Rule 10b-5: the importance of the 
cause of action in “maintain[ing] public confidence in the marketplace . . . 
by deterring fraud, in part, through the availability of private securities 
fraud actions”97 and the potential for vexatious litigation in the modern 
class-action setting.
98
 The Court focused on two settings in which 
plaintiffs would be able to show inflation at Time 1 but should not be 
entitled to a recovery.
99
 The first is if there is a misrepresentation about the 
securities, which, for example, inflates their price above their true worth, 
but plaintiff sells while the misrepresentation remains alive in the market 
and is not harmed.
100
 Here, there would be misrepresentation, but no loss 
(yet). Second, the Court identified the context in which there is 
misrepresentation and loss to the plaintiff, but the loss can be said to arise 
from a source other than the fraud.
101
  
The first is a familiar problem addressed, for example, in the language 
of Section 11 of the 1933 Act.
102
 The second is the traditional space for 
 
 
 94. Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 346. 
 95. Id. at 346–47.  
 96. Id. at 342. 
 97. Id. at 345 (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997); Randall v. 
Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986)). 
 98. See Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 347–48. Here, the Court echoes Blue Chip Stamps and the 
dissenters in Basic. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 262 (1988) (White, J., dissenting); Blue Chip 
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 747–48 (1975); see also Sale, supra note 75, at 552–68 
(discussing Congress’s reform movement to curb vexatious litigation); Choi & Thompson, supra note 
76 (same). 
 99. Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 336, 342.  
 100.  Id. at 342. 
 101.  Id. at 342–43. 
 102. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a), (e) (2014) (permitting recovery by any person acquiring a security 
for which a registration statement contains an untrue statement of material fact, but limiting recovery 
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loss causation both in common-law fraud and in securities-market cases.
103
 
The Court’s holding is straightforward and noncontroversial, illustrating 
the difference between the front and back end of 10b-5 cases and the 
procedural context that frames current litigation.
104
 In the end, the Court’s 
holding had a limited effect. On remand, with the pleading on the loss-
causation element adjusted from Time 1 to Time 2, the complaint survived 
a motion to dismiss.
105
  
2. Halliburton I: Proof of Loss Causation Is Not Required to Show 
Reliance at Time 1 or for Class Certification  
Next in the line of evolution is Halliburton I,
106
 a case that also 
revolved around loss causation. Here, the focus shifted from pleading loss 
causation, which turned out to be quite easy in light of Dura, to whether 
the plaintiffs had to prove loss causation at the class-certification stage.
107
 
Defeating a case at class certification is a win for defendants, because the 
matter will presumably disappear. Moreover, at that point, the insurance 
policy is still paying the defense lawyers’ fees, and a trial on the merits, 
with the concomitant discovery and spectacle of officers and directors on 
the stand, goes away.  
This case came to the Supreme Court from the Fifth Circuit, which had 
earlier held that in order to invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption of 
reliance at class certification, the plaintiff had to prove (not just plead) loss 
causation.
108
 The Supreme Court rejected this argument.
109
 Reflecting the 
learning of Dura about the role of the loss-causation element as distinct 
from transaction causation/reliance, the Court held that loss causation’s 
focus on Time 2 has “no logical connection to the facts necessary to 
 
 
to the difference between the amount paid and the price received in the market before suit if that price 
remains inflated at the time of the sale, such that purchaser will have suffered no economic loss); see 
also generally Hillary A. Sale, Disappearing Without a Trace: Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 
Securities Act, 75 WASH. L. REV. 429 (2000). 
 103. Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 343. 
 104. But see the Court’s inclusion of a quotation from Justice White’s dissent in Basic, which uses 
a “Cf.” signal to suggest an analogous example of investor insurance when allowing recovery in the 
face of affirmative evidence of nonreliance, thus blurring the lines between reliance and loss 
causation. Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 345. 
 105. In re Dura Pharms., Inc. Sec. Litig., 452 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (S.D. Cal. 2006); see also In re 
Dura Pharms., Inc. Sec. Litig., 548 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (subsequent litigation).  
 106. Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that plaintiffs must prove loss causation to qualify for certification), abrogated by Halliburton 
I, 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011). 
 109.  Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2184–87. 
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establish” the Basic presumption of reliance at Time 1, when an investor 
decides to buy securities.
110
 Reliance and loss causation are separate 
elements and together mean, for example, that even if investors relied on a 
defendant’s misrepresentation at Time 1 to buy securities when the price 
was distorted by fraud, they cannot recover absent loss causation at 
Time 2.
111
 The Court was also clear that only the first question is relevant 
at class certification.
112
 
Halliburton I also reaffirmed the core learnings of Basic. First, reliance 
connects misrepresentations to injury.
113
 Second, requiring plaintiffs to 
demonstrate reliance in the same manner as in a traditional face-to-face 
fraud action would be impossible and would create an unnecessary and 
unrealistic evidentiary burden for open-market claims.
114
 Indeed, the 
requirement would block class actions. And, third, fraud on the market 
resolves the reliance concern and, in doing so, provides a path for recovery 
for fraud that helps to ensure public trust in the markets.
115
 The Court also 
reaffirmed Basic’s holding as to what the plaintiffs must show to gain the 
presumption of reliance. Here, the Court noted that plaintiffs have to 
demonstrate that the alleged misrepresentations were publicly known, that 
the market was efficient, and that the purchase or sale of stock occurred 
between the misrepresentations and the truth.
116
  
The Court refused, however, to take up the defendants’ efforts to 
characterize the opinion below as not about loss causation, but really about 
the conditions for gaining the presumption of reliance.
117
 Halliburton 
argued that the Court should require the plaintiffs to establish whether the 
alleged misrepresentations affected the market price in the first place, or 
whether the misrepresentations had a “price impact” on Halliburton’s 
stock.
118
 The Court rejected this characterization of the lower court’s 
opinion, as well as the conflation of the elements, and refused to reach for 
 
 
 110.  Id. at 2186. 
 111.  See id. 
 112. Id. This part of the opinion is simple enough and may reflect why the opinion was a 
unanimous, five-page opinion with only one unnumbered footnote.  
 113. Id. at 2184–85. 
 114. Id. at 2185.  
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. Note that this listing of the preconditions leaves out materiality, an omission the Court in 
Amgen later reinserts without discussion. The list itself comes from footnote 27 of Basic, where that 
Court seemed to be simply citing from the Court of Appeals opinion below. It is a very humble 
beginning for what turns out to be the determining issue of Halliburton II. See discussion infra Part 
III.B. 
 117.  Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2186–87. 
 118. See Fisch, supra note 13, at 897 n.8. 
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this issue, leaving the difficulty of proving reliance, or the lack thereof, in 
the open-market setting for what turned out to be Halliburton II.
119
  
3. Amgen: Materiality Need Not Be Proved at Class Certification 
Before Basic Is Invoked  
In between Halliburton I and Halliburton II, defendants argued that 
plaintiffs must prove materiality at the class-certification stage in order to 
invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption.
120
 The Court was no more 
open to this argument than the loss-causation one.
121
 This opinion, 
however, was substantially longer and more complex. It also generated 
three dissents and left space for additional litigation of the issues the Court 
did not decide. 
Materiality, like loss causation, is one of the elements of Rule 10b-5 
fraud imported from the common law. Notably, neither of these elements 
is among the ones that Congress, in the PSLRA, decided to subject to the 
motion to dismiss and discovery stay.
122
 In addition, materiality, unlike 
loss causation, is specifically mentioned in Basic as one of the 
prerequisites the plaintiff must show to invoke the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption of reliance (discussed in more detail in the next Part).
123
 
Defendants argued that because materiality was a predicate for the 
presumption of reliance, and without that presumption individual claims 
would dominate over common ones, plaintiffs should have to prove 
materiality at class certification.
124
  
The Supreme Court held that although proof of materiality is required 
to prevail on the merits, it is not a prerequisite to class certification.
125
 The 
Court’s opinion is strongly rooted in procedure, and more particularly in 
Rule 23(b)(3), which requires that common issues predominate to gain 
class certification.
126
 The Court first pointed out that Rule 23(b)(3) 
requires only a showing that the questions common to the class 
predominate, not that they are answered on the merits for the class.
127
 
Then, the Court noted that materiality is an objective standard: it is a 
 
 
 119. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
 120. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2013). 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  See id. at 1200–01. 
 123.  Id. at 1195. 
 124.  Id. 
 125. Id. at 1194–1204.  
 126. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 127. Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1194–95. 
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question common to all class members.
128
 Thus, if the plaintiffs were 
unable to prove materiality, they would fail to do so for all class members, 
not for individuals, and therefore individual issues would not predominate 
on the question of materiality.
129
 Specifically, the Court reasoned, “[a]s to 
materiality, therefore, the class is entirely cohesive: It will prevail or fail in 
unison.”130 As a result, the Court concluded that Rule 23(b)(3) did not 
stand in the way of certification.
131
 Indeed, the role of 23(b)(3) is to 
determine only which method of adjudication is best and not to adjudicate 
the case in its entirety.
132
 
Three other aspects of the Court’s opinion are worth noting. First, the 
Court responded to Amgen’s policy argument that the failure to adopt its 
view would result in unwarranted settlement pressure.
133
 The Court 
emphasized that Congress dealt with this issue through the PSLRA and did 
not choose to require early proof of materiality (or loss causation).
134
 
Instead, the Court stated that it had “no warrant to encumber securities-
fraud litigation by adopting an atextual requirement of precertification 
proof of materiality that Congress, despite its extensive involvement in the 
securities field, has not sanctioned.”135 
Second, the Court rejected Amgen’s argument that proof of materiality 
at class certification would conserve judicial resources, stating that, in fact, 
“Amgen’s position . . . would waste judicial resources.”136 The Court’s 
point here is that increasing the focus on procedural resolutions of these 
claims complicates the litigation. Specifically, the Court noted that 
elevating proof of materiality (or loss causation) to the class-certification 
stage would create more, not less, litigation, resulting in “a mini-trial . . . 
at the class-certification stage” that “would entail considerable 
expenditures of judicial time and resources, costs scarcely anticipated by 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1)(A), which instructs that the 
decision whether to certify a class action be made ‘[a]t an early practicable 
time.’”137  
 
 
 128. Id. at 1195–96.  
 129. Id. at 1191. This is the classic test for Rule 23(b)(3).  
 130. Id. 
 131.  Id. at 1194–1204. 
 132. Id. at 1191; see also Langevoort, supra note 13, at 42.  
 133.  Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1199–1202. 
 134.  Id. at 1200–01. 
 135. Id. at 1202. 
 136.  Id. at 1201. 
 137. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A)). The series of cases discussed 
here are proof of that issue. Dura was filed in 1999, went before the Supreme Court in 2005, and was 
resolved through settlement in 2009. Jocelyn Allison, $14M Settlement Reached in Dura Securities 
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Finally, four justices dissented or concurred in Amgen, raising a 
broader question that set the stage for Halliburton II. Justice Alito’s 
concurrence pointed out that the majority did not “revisit” Basic or the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption.
138
 He then noted that recent evidence 
“suggest[ed]” that the market-efficiency presumption might rest on a 
faulty economic premise,
139
 referring to Justice Thomas’s dissent, which 
Justices Kennedy and Scalia, in part, joined. The four justices appeared to 
be calling for an opportunity to overturn Basic,
140
 and within months, the 
Court granted certiorari in Halliburton II. A holding in line with the four 
justices would effectively eliminate securities class actions, and, thus, 
raised heightened interest in the Court’s Halliburton II deliberations. 
4. Halliburton II: Affirming the Basic Presumption and Rejecting 
Proof, but Allowing Rebuttal, of Presumption at Class Certification  
Halliburton I and Amgen paved the way for a full-on assault on Basic 
and the fraud-on-the-market presumption. They created the space for a 
robust challenge to the existence of 10b-5 securities-fraud class actions. 
Halliburton II posed the question about proving market efficiency at the 
class-certification stage, but that was not the issue on most minds at the 
time the case was argued. Instead, the focus was on whether the Court 
would eliminate the fraud-on-the-market presumption altogether.
141
 
The blockbuster possibility of Halliburton II failed to materialize. 
Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion reaffirmed the core holdings of 
Basic:
142
 the element of reliance provides a connection between a 
misstatement and a purchase or sale, the traditional common-law form of 
 
 
Suit, LAW 360 (Mar. 24, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/93418/14m-settlement-
reached-in-dura-securities-suit. Amgen was filed in 2007, went before the Supreme Court in 2013, and 
remains unresolved as of 2015. See Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1204; Complaint for Violation of Federal 
Securities Laws, Kairalla v. Amgen Inc., No. CV 07 2536 PSG (PLAx) (C.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2007), 
2007 WL 4966000. Halliburton was filed in 2002, went before the Supreme Court in 2011 and 2014, 
and remains unresolved as of 2015. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014); Archdiocese of Milwaukee 
Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-1152-M, 2012 WL 565997 (N.D. 
Tex. Jan. 27, 2012). 
 138. Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1204. Note, however, that Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion did state 
that Congress had rejected the opportunity to revisit market efficiency. Id. at 1201. 
 139. Id. at 1204. 
 140. See id. at 1204–16 (2013). This is an argument that the majority addressed and rebuffed, 
pointing out that Congress implicitly approved of the fraud-on-the-market presumption when it 
adopted the PSLRA. Id. at 1200. 
 141. See Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Cases to Watch: Where Halliburton Might Make Its Mark, LAW 
360 (June 22, 2015, 8:26 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/670778/cases-to-watch-where-
halliburton-might-make-its-mark.  
 142. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2407–17. 
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reliance poses an unnecessarily unreasonable burden, and the rebuttable 
presumption of market reliance resolves the issue in an appropriate fashion 
for these anonymous transactions.
143
 The Court also rejected the 
defendants’ effort to require the plaintiff to prove price impact at class 
certification in order to invoke the presumption, noting that requirement 
would “effectively jettison half of [the presumption].”144 Nevertheless, and 
in contravention of its expressed concern in Amgen about mini-trials, the 
Court held that the defendants were entitled to the opportunity at class 
certification to disprove market efficiency, referring to it as price impact, 
and creating confusion about the possible conflation of reliance, 
materiality, and loss causation.
145
 As a result, the term “price impact,” 
defined but unused in Halliburton I, and not used in Amgen, became the 
point of contest left open in Halliburton II.
146
 
Recall that before we detoured to Amgen, the Court had remanded 
Halliburton I, noting that any arguments properly preserved remained 
available to Halliburton.
147
 Thus, on remand, the defendants argued that 
class certification remained inappropriate.
148
 The core of their argument 
was that the evidence that they used to attempt to disprove loss causation 
revealed that the alleged misstatements did not impact the price of the 
stock.
149
 The lack of a price impact at Time 2, they argued, rebutted the 
Time 1, Basic presumption, created a situation in which individual issues 
predominated over common ones, and defeated the use of the class-action 
mechanism.
150
 
The District Court rejected that argument and held that the defendants 
could not defeat class certification by forcing the plaintiffs to prove (or 
allowing defendants to disprove) the reliance element before the merits 
stage.
151
 The Fifth Circuit, relying on Amgen, affirmed.
152
 According to 
 
 
 143. Id. at 2407–08, 2417. 
 144. Id. at 2414. 
 145. Id. at 2417.  
 146. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 13, at 898–99; Langevoort, supra note 13, at 38–39.  
 147. Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2187 (2011). 
 148.  Defendants’ Brief Opposing Class Certification and, in the Alternative, Request to 
Supplement the Record at 1, Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 
3:02-CV-1152-M (N.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2011), 2011 WL 7562399. 
 149. Id. at 1–2. 
 150. Id. at 2–3. 
 151. Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02-CV-1152-M, 
2012 WL 565997, at *1–3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2012), vacated and remanded by Erica P. John Fund, 
Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 765 F.3d 550 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 152. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 718 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2013), vacated and 
remanded by Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
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both courts, the defendants could use the price-impact evidence at trial, 
where actual proof is required, but not at class certification.
153
 
The defendants again petitioned for and gained a grant of certiorari 
from the Supreme Court.
154
 And, unlike in Amgen, when the Court pushed 
the defendants back to trial for materiality, the Court opened a window for 
yet another fight at class certification.
155
 To do so, the Court distinguished 
materiality from reliance, stating that materiality is “an objective issue 
susceptible to common, classwide proof.”156 All plaintiffs rise and fall 
together with a material or immaterial misstatement, defeating the claim 
on the merits. In contrast, the Court opined, price impact differs from 
materiality, because price impact is fundamental to Basic’s premise: “It 
thus has everything to do with the issue of predominance at the class 
certification stage. . . . [Price impact] must be proved before class 
certification.”157 Although the first part of the Court’s opinion affirmed the 
Basic reliance presumption and, thus, the class-action mechanism, the last 
part left space for the defendants to rebut the presumption—at the class-
certification stage and, thus, before there is a trial or a jury.
158
 In reaching 
its holding, the Court focused on price impact,
159
 or more properly, the 
absence of price impact, as a term that it defined to provide the common 
link from Basic that would enable the reliance presumption.
160
  
This review of the cases reveals that defendants’ dragnet for issues that 
can be decided at an early stage of litigation has reached almost every 
element of the traditional fraud claim, with materiality, reliance, and loss 
causation scrutinized for requirements about what the plaintiff must prove 
to invoke the presumption of Basic at class certification. We know from 
Halliburton I that loss causation is not on the list,
161
 and from Amgen that 
materiality is not either.
162
 Halliburton II tells us that plaintiffs continue to 
be entitled to the presumption of reliance, but at the same time, the Court 
 
 
 153. Id. at 433.  
 154. See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
 155. See generally Langevoort, supra note 13.  
 156. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2416. 
 157. Id.  
 158. Id. at 2407–17.  
 159. The term is used twenty-two times in three pages. See id. at 2415–17. For example, the Court 
states that “[t]he first three prerequisites [of what must be shown to get the Basic presumption] are 
directed at price impact—whether the alleged misrepresentations affected the market price in the first 
place.” Id. at 2414 (internal quotation marks omitted). This statement, of course, is aimed at Time 1. 
See id.  
 160.  Id. at 2417. 
 161. See supra notes 106–19 and accompanying text. 
 162. See supra notes 120–40 and accompanying text. 
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gives prominence to the term “price impact” and permits defendants to 
deploy it to rebut the presumption at class certification.
163
 
As a group, these three cases, along with Dura, all contain narrow 
holdings. Until Halliburton II, the Court avoided the big issue left open in 
Basic: rebuttal of the presumption. Although the Court recognized space 
for rebuttal in Halliburton II, we still do not know what proof of the 
requisite connection between an open-market purchase and a 
misrepresentation will look like. As a result, although Halliburton II 
narrowed the field of play, price impact, a largely undeveloped term, now 
has the potential to create confusion, complexity, and mini-trials focused 
on econometric studies.
164
 Before turning to those concerns in Part IV, 
however, we first develop the growth of the term “price impact” and its 
meaning in relation to Time 1.  
B. The Growth of Price Impact 
As Halliburton II makes clear, the term “price impact” is now on 
steroids, and, as a result, a more detailed understanding of its role and 
growth is necessary. The story has a humble beginning in the prerequisites 
for the presumption of reliance that first appeared in a footnote in Basic.
165
 
Price impact is not among the prerequisites listed.
166
 Instead, it merits only 
an indirect reference in the discussion of how the presumption might be 
rebutted.
167
 More than twenty years later, Halliburton I and Amgen treat 
the presumption prerequisites cavalierly and their relationship to price 
impact even more so. In short, the Court ducks the hard question as to the 
requirements for the causal relationship between the defendants’ fraud and 
the plaintiffs’ trading loss in an open-market transaction. This section of 
the Article follows the Court’s stunted development of price impact in 
these cases. Then, in Part IV, we engage in the theoretical discussions 
about the securities class action, developing the goals of securities 
regulation in the context of publicness as well as the role of market 
efficiency/market intermediation in securities transactions and litigation. 
We then apply those constructs to the price-impact element. 
The starting point for the role of price impact is the discussion about 
the requirements necessary to establish Basic’s presumption of reliance, 
 
 
 163. See supra notes 141–159 and accompanying text. 
 164. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 13, at 920–21; Langevoort, supra note 13, at 56–57; see also 
Pritchard & Sale, supra note 72.  
 165.  Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 n.27 (1988). 
 166.  See id. 
 167.  See id. at 248–49. 
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which the Halliburton II Court collapsed to price impact.
168
 Basic 
relegated this key issue to a footnote, and even there, it did little more than 
restate the view of the Court of Appeals.
169
 
The elements listed in footnote 27 are: 
1. [T]hat the defendant made public misrepresentations; 
2. [T]hat the misrepresentations were material; 
3. [T]hat the shares were traded on an efficient market; 
4. [T]hat the misrepresentations would induce a reasonable, relying 
investor to misjudge the value of the shares; and 
5. [T]hat the plaintiff traded the shares between the time the 
misrepresentations were made and the time the truth was 
revealed.
170
 
The Supreme Court promptly cut that list from five to four, concluding 
that its holding as to materiality in an earlier part of the Basic opinion 
would collapse elements 2 and 4 into one.
171
  
Price impact was only mentioned later, when the Court addressed 
rebuttal of the reliance presumption. There, the Court referred to three 
disjunctive paths listed by the lower court, stating that the defendants 
could “rebut proof of the elements giving rise to the presumption, or show 
that the misrepresentation in fact did not lead to a distortion of price[,] or 
that an individual plaintiff traded or would have traded despite his 
knowing the statement was false.”172 The Basic Court then concluded that 
“[a]ny showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation 
and either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to 
trade at a fair market price, will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of 
reliance.”173  
The Court also provided three examples of potential rebuttals. The first 
is a situation in which “market makers” were privy to the truth about the 
merger discussions, and as a result, the market would not have been 
 
 
 168. See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2416 (“Price impact is thus an essential precondition for any 
Rule 10b-5 class action.”). 
 169. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 n.27. 
 170. Id.  
 171. Id. Interestingly, the Court of Appeals had said that element 4 was the only one really at 
issue, but then found that it had been satisfied for pleading purposes. Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 
741, 750–51 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 172. Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 (emphasis added) (citing Levinson, 786 F.2d at 750 n.6). 
 173. Id.  
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affected when the news became public.
174
 The second is when news of the 
merger credibly entered the market through another source and dissipated 
the effects of the misstatement.
175
 The third is when a plaintiff believed 
Basic’s statements were false, but sold because of unrelated concerns (e.g., 
potential antitrust problems).
176
 
We know from their correspondence that Justices Blackmun and 
Brennan (two of the four in the majority) engaged in a vigorous debate 
about the strength of the causal link required to show reliance in market 
transactions and particularly the conditions for this rebuttal. For Brennan, 
even if there were reasons other than the fraud that the plaintiff traded, the 
reduced amount that plaintiff received is sufficiently connected to the 
defendant’s wrongful conduct as to permit recovery under 10b-5.177 For 
Blackmun, such a trader had been injured (the misrepresentation having 
led to a lower price than the investor would have received in a market with 
no fraud) but was not defrauded (i.e., the loss and the wrongful conduct 
were not sufficiently connected).
178
 Both justices agreed that there was 
little practical difference in their two positions—which related only to the 
space available to the defendant to rebut the presumption of reliance that 
both justices agreed was appropriate in an open-market setting, a rebuttal 
they believed would be very difficult or impractical for defendants.
179
 Yet 
 
 
 174. Id.  
 175. Id. at 248–49. 
 176. Id. at 249. 
 177. See Letter from William Brennan to Harry Blackmun at 1 (Jan. 22, 1988) (on file with 
authors) (stating that the misstatement served as cause-in-fact of injury given the lower market price 
for the stock; the necessary link between misrepresentation and injury has been shown without the 
need to show what Brennan called transactional reliance). Professor Langevoort has earlier discussed 
this correspondence, concluding 10b-5 law would be clearer on this issue if Brennan’s views had 
prevailed. See Langevoort, supra note 13, at 49–50. That discussion and this is based on the 
correspondence at the Library of Congress first identified by Adam Pritchard. 
 178. See Letter from Harry Blackmun to William Brennan at 2 (Jan. 25, 1988) (on file with 
authors). Blackmun’s letter identified two reasons why the presumption did not apply, both of which 
are reflected in his opinion in Basic addressing rebuttal of the presumption: “If the material 
misrepresentation did not affect the price, then those who traded at market price were not affected by 
the misrepresentation. Similarly, if there exists such a person who did not rely on the integrity of the 
market price to be accurate, that person was not defrauded by the misrepresentation (although he did 
receive less money for his shares than he would have received absent the misrepresentation).” Id. 
Blackmun had made the same point in his first response to Brennan. See Letter from Harry Blackmun 
to William Brennan at 2 (Jan. 15, 1988) (on file with authors) (“The presumption of reliance depends 
on a link between the misrepresentation and the injury. If the defendant can prove that either the price 
would not have changed or that a particular plaintiff would have traded at the ‘incorrect’ price 
nonetheless, he should be entitled to rebut the presumption.”). 
 179. Compare Letter from Harry Blackmun to William Brennan at 2 (Jan. 15, 1988) (stating that 
rebuttal would “not [be] very useful to defendants . . . because it would be very burdensome to prove”) 
with Letter from William Brennan to Harry Blackmun (Jan. 27, 1988) (suspecting that defendant will 
find it impractical to use the rebuttal option).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
522 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:487 
 
 
 
 
this narrow, even esoteric, rebuttal space remained and gained new 
attention, as discussed below, when the Court reaffirmed Basic in 2014.  
Twenty-three years after Basic, the Supreme Court elevated the 
elements necessary to gain the presumption of reliance from the Basic 
footnote to the text of the Halliburton I opinion, but inexplicably dropped 
materiality.
180
 Price impact was now expressly identified by the Court, 
albeit indirectly. Recall from the discussion in Part III.A that the 
Halliburton defendants argued the Fifth Circuit had not really focused on 
loss causation (which the Supreme Court held was not a requirement to 
gain the presumption of reliance), but rather price impact (which the 
defendant argued should be a requirement to gain the presumption).
181
 The 
Court rejected that reading of what the Fifth Circuit had done and then 
proceeded to define price impact, stating, “‘Price impact’ simply refers to 
the effect of a misrepresentation on a stock price.”182 Next, the Court drew 
in reliance (an issue not before it), stating that “if a misrepresentation [did] 
not affect market price, an investor [could not] be said to have relied on 
the misrepresentation merely because he purchased stock at that price.”183 
In short, this means that a price unaffected by fraud does not reflect fraud. 
Although the Court did not express a view on Halliburton’s argument, this 
rendition of the argument leaves room for price impact in the form of price 
support, or propping up a price, to be distinguished from moving the price 
up or down. Simply put, the fact that a price does not move does not mean 
that there was no price distortion or impact. Instead, the lack of movement 
may be price impact in the form of price maintenance. 
In Amgen, where materiality was at the core of the case, the Court did 
some backing and filling with respect to its omission of materiality in the 
Halliburton I list of requirements for the presumption of reliance. Amgen 
listed four elements as necessary to gain the presumption of reliance: 
(1) publicity, (2) materiality, (3) efficient market, and (4) trade timing.
184
 
The fourth element, trade timing, or a requirement that the plaintiff trade 
between the time of the misrepresentation and the correction, was now 
 
 
 180. See Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185 (2011). Materiality was not at issue in that case, but 
its omission is arguably sloppy for the nation’s most prestigious court.  
 181. See supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text.  
 182. Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2187. 
 183. Id.  
 184. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1209 (2013). The 
incomplete listing in Halliburton I is passed over as a list that “includ[es]” some of the elements. Id. at 
1198–99. 
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described as an inquiry into adequacy of representation and was not tied to 
the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).
185
  
Of the remaining three elements, the Court found one, materiality, 
cannot be contested at class certification.
186
 The Court’s rationale was that 
if materiality failed, it would prevent all plaintiffs from suing, and did not, 
therefore, “give rise to any prospect of individual questions overwhelming 
common [questions].”187 The other two, publicity and market efficiency, 
remain contestable at class certification.
188
 The Amgen Court did not 
specifically discuss materiality’s possible overlap with price impact except 
to say that “immaterial information, by definition, does not affect market 
price.”189 
Finally, Halliburton II completed the movement of the predicates of 
Basic’s footnote 27 to center stage. The fourth element, trade timing, was 
confirmed as within the zone of typicality and adequacy.
190
 Importantly, 
the Court took the first three predicates—publicity, materiality, and market 
efficiency—and presented them as price impact, previously defined in 
Halliburton I.
191
 Then, the Court gave them significant new importance 
when it stated that “[i]n the absence of price impact, Basic’s fraud-on-the-
market theory and presumption of reliance collapse.”192 
Of course, given the holding in Amgen, the Court faced a situation in 
which it now put publicity, materiality, and market efficiency together as 
directed toward price impact, but had previously carved off materiality as 
unsuitable for class certification. The result is that the same substantive 
inquiry bearing one label was pushed back to the merits, but with another 
label could be considered at class certification. We return to this issue in 
Part IV. 
Finally, the Halliburton II Court also deployed an example of the role 
of price impact in determining market efficiency, and here is where the 
contradictions begin to grow. The Court posited a situation in which the 
defendants submitted event studies that examined the price of the stock in 
 
 
 185. Id. at 1198. 
 186.  Id. at 1197–1202. 
 187. Id. at 1199. In reaching this holding, the Court rejected both the idea that plaintiffs should 
have to prove materiality and that defendants can disprove it at class certification. Id. at 1194–99. 
 188. Id. at 1198. 
 189. Id. at 1195. The Court noted that when “a market is generally efficient in incorporating 
publicly available information into a security’s market price, it is reasonable to presume that a 
particular public, material misrepresentation will be reflected in the security’s price.” Id. at 1192. 
 190. See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2412 (2014).  
 191. Id. at 2414. 
 192. Id.  
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relation to six events.
193
 If one of the studies examined the alleged 
misrepresentation and revealed no price impact at Time 1, and the other 
five studies showed price impact, then the Court concluded that it would 
face a situation in which both the market was efficient and the 
misstatement alleged in the complaint had no price impact.
194
 The Court 
then pointed out that the result in that situation, absent the opportunity for 
the defendants to rebut the presumption, would be certification, “even 
though the fraud-on-the-market theory does not apply and common 
reliance thus cannot be presumed.”195  
The Court’s analysis is problematic unless it is reframed to include 
price stabilization. The Court’s discussion here and its prior discussion of 
price impact in Halliburton I did not directly address price stabilization. 
Yet, in the prototypical fraud case where, for example, misstatements 
continue a trend of positive news, the price impact can be price 
maintenance with little to no movement. That was the fact pattern in the 
Halliburton cases (and in Amgen and Dura).
196
 Thus, to make sense of the 
Court’s use of price impact, we have to reconcile it with the Court’s 
failure to address price stabilization/maintenance and its role in most fraud 
cases. 
In sum, the Court’s development of the predicates for Basic’s 
presumption and its use of price impact as a proxy for those elements 
reveals a pattern of initial inattention and sloppiness about the elements of 
the presumption that then left space for litigants to make use of procedural 
mechanisms to plumb the intricacies of the presumption. Not surprisingly, 
that is what they are doing. Shortly after Halliburton II was decided, 
courts began to apply it, ruling that defendants could attempt to prove the 
lack of price impact at class certification. For example, Regions Bank won 
review of the issue in a case involving its merger with AmSouth 
Bancorp.
197
 Halliburton won a similar right, leading to subsequent class 
 
 
 193. Id. at 2415. 
 194. Id.  
 195. Id. But see Alon Brav & J.B. Heaton, Event Studies in Securities Litigation: Low Power, 
Confounding Effects, and Bias, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (comparing the use of single-
firm event studies, and their weaknesses, as used in securities-fraud litigation, with the multi-firm 
studies that academic research and peer-reviewed journals consider reliable). 
 196. See supra Part III.A. 
 197. Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery & Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., 762 F.3d 
1248, 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2014). On remand the trial court found no rebuttal of the presumption. 
Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery & Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., No. CV-10-J-2847-
S, 2014 WL 6661918, at *7–8 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 19, 2014). 
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certification for one of the claims but not five others.
198
 And, in the case of 
AIG, which had been stayed pending the outcome of Halliburton II, the 
company quickly agreed to a $960 million settlement in a case involving 
representations about credit default swaps.
199
  
The task of courts attempting to resolve these questions has been 
exacerbated by the Supreme Court’s reluctance to explicate the reliance 
connection that is sufficient for open-market fraud relief in today’s public 
markets. Defendants continue to occupy the space created by this 
ambiguity by pushing for new issues to be decided at class certification, 
including, for example, an argument for requiring a showing of an 
effective measure of damages. Recently, a Texas federal court declined to 
certify a class, focusing on how an event study would incorporate various 
theories of liability.
200
 This opinion, along with the ones described in this 
Article, are examples of what Professor Don Langevoort has described as 
litigation taking the form of a repeat “game of whack-a-mole.”201 To make 
sense of this game, then, an understanding of the theory of market 
regulation, as well as the theory of market efficiency and market 
intermediation and its role in class actions, is necessary. We turn there 
next.  
IV.  MARKET INTERMEDIATION AND THE SECURITIES CLASS ACTION 
The Court’s affirmance of Basic in Halliburton II made clear that the 
securities class action as enabled by market efficiency is here to stay. 
Nevertheless, this area of the law still suffers from gaps and a missing set 
of guiding principles to unify our understanding of the securities class 
action. We develop those principles in this Part of the Article. We begin 
by exploring the goals of securities regulation that are generally deployed 
in theoretical discussions of the securities class action—investor 
protection and corporate governance—and then add to those a set of 
additional goals that focus not only on investors but on the market and its 
stability more generally. These latter goals are in the publicness space 
 
 
 198. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. 251, 254 (N.D. Tex. 2015) 
(granting class certification for one corrective disclosure and denying class status for five others). 
 199. Noah Buhayar & Kelly Gilblom, AIG Agrees to Settle 2008 Securities Litigation for $960 
Million, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Aug. 4, 2014, 3:24 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-
08-04/aig-agrees-to-settle-2008-securities-litigation-for-960-million. 
 200. In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., Civil Action No. 4:10-md-2185, 2013 WL 6388408, at *16–18 
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2013) (finding, pre-Halliburton II, that a non-securities Supreme Court case, 
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013), “signals a significant shift in the scrutiny required 
for class certification”). 
 201. Langevoort, supra note 13, at 46. 
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about which each of the Authors has previously written.
202
 We argue that 
publicness helps to explain the more robust goals of securities regulation 
as well as the role of the class action in enforcement and deterrence.  
Next, we develop the market’s role as an intermediary on both the front 
and back ends of securities regulation. That role, it turns out, is important 
to understanding the evolution of the common-law tort of fraud into 
today’s fraud-on-the-market-based 10b-5 class action, as well as the 
specific issue of price impact. The market-as-intermediary and the 
correlative efficient-market theories play an enabling role in the front-end, 
disclosure regulation space. As a result, market efficiency and market 
intermediation enable and facilitate both offerings and enforcement of 
securities regulation. We conclude, therefore, that because most securities 
transactions in public corporations now occur in open, anonymous, and 
increasingly sophisticated public markets, the regulatory and enforcement 
mechanisms have also evolved, and must continue to do so, to recognize 
the market as an intermediary in those processes. The result is a market 
intermediation substitute in both the regulatory and the enforcement/class-
action contexts that encompasses publicness in order to support economic 
growth through strong markets and innovation. 
Finally, we turn to a specific discussion of the 10b-5 class action and 
the reliance element, developing a construct of the doctrine in the 
securities regulatory world where publicness plays a role. Here, we create 
an analytic framework for the 10b-5 tort’s evolution, again with particular 
attention to the role of market intermediation. We then deploy the 
construct of the market as intermediary in the more limited context of 
price impact, providing an example of how market intermediation and 
publicness can help to resolve questions in securities class actions. 
A. The Publicness of Securities Regulation and Enforcement 
We begin by adding to the theoretical work about the role of regulation 
and enforcement in the securities class-action context. Many of our 
colleagues in the academy have explored securities regulatory goals and 
securities class actions, concluding that investor-protection and corporate 
governance/agency cost arguments provide varying degrees of support (or 
lack of support) for a theory of these claims.
203
 Investor protection, of 
 
 
 202. See supra note 18.  
 203. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the 
Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (2011); Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private 
Securities Litigation, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 333; Merritt B. Fox, Why Civil Liability for Disclosure 
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course, is an important aspect of the class action and is also a core 
securities regulatory concern more generally. Nevertheless, as the most 
recent market crash reveals, the system is larger than any one issuer, or set 
of investors, and the choices of issuers have serious and lasting impacts 
beyond just investors who invest in any one company. As a result, 
although we begin with investor protection and corporate governance and 
their place in the regulatory impulse, we expand the discussion to include 
goals focused less on investor-specific concerns and more on developing 
strong and healthy markets and enabling innovation and growth. These 
goals are less about investors per se, and more about the larger society or 
publicness. The idea is that issuers both impact and are impacted by the 
market and forces outside those of the individual entity.
204
  
Publicness, we argue here, has become part of the securities regulatory 
impulse. As the extremely slow recovery and lagging economic growth 
after the 2008–2009 financial crisis have revealed, strong markets are key 
to innovation and growth. In the US system, we have chosen a disclosure-
based regulatory system to address the issues that might otherwise hinder 
the development of strong, healthy capital markets. Those regulations are 
generally on the front end—the offering side of securities transactions. 
They are complemented by both government/public and private (e.g., class 
actions) enforcement. After developing the discussion of the goals and 
regulatory choices, we will turn to deterrence and the role of the class 
action in providing back-end securities regulation.
205
  
Investor protection has long been linked to the securities class action. 
The litigation roots of the 10b-5 claims are in traditional torts based on 
personal economic injury, and have continued to evolve as the claim has 
been redefined as a class action, focused on more collective decisions 
reflecting market intermediation of investor choices. Although we do not 
recount all of the investor-protection arguments here, the thrust is the class 
action’s effectiveness in protecting investors—despite its shortcomings, 
 
 
Violations When Issuers Do Not Trade?, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 297; Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, 
Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207 
(2009); Steven A. Ramirez, The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation: An Historic and 
Macroeconomic Perspective, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 669, 724–25 (2014); Robert B. Thompson & Hillary 
A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 
859 (2003). 
 204. See supra notes 18–19 for a discussion of publicness.  
 205. There are, of course, additional goals beyond disclosure and enforcement. Both the 1933 and 
1934 Acts have important provisions directed toward cabining the selling process. See Robert B. 
Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial 
Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1575 (2013) (describing purposes of American securities 
regulation). 
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including a lack of significant compensation and potentially excessive 
costs for a largely diversified investor pool. We acknowledge these issues, 
though as we explore in Part B of this section, many reforms to the 
securities class action have worked to reduce these concerns.
206
  
In the core securities setting, when an investor is buying or selling 
securities, regulation addresses informational asymmetries—issuers and 
their managers (and sometimes other traders) know more about the 
intangible interests being traded, and these parties’ incentives to disclose 
are less than perfect.
207
 Offerors have inadequate incentives to disclose for 
various reasons, including, for example, worries about revealing valuable 
information that competitors can use.
208
 In addition, shares traded in the 
market are not fungible across companies. The value of one company is 
different from another, and investors are not all experts or commercial 
operators.
209
 Disclosure helps to fill the gaps between offerors and 
investors, and standardized disclosures allow investors to compare offerors 
to each other before investing. Regulations that cut across issuers help to 
create a baseline from which all offerors and investors can operate on an 
equal basis, without fear of the competitive concerns or the impact of 
private costs of disclosure on investors, also have aspects of publicness.
210
 
A socially optimal level of disclosure, and one that is evenly applied, 
arguably requires a public mandatory system, rather than private 
ordering.
211
 Good disclosures, with the market as an intermediary, will in 
turn attract capital and facilitate growth and innovation. 
Securities regulations directed toward corporate governance (think 
proxy regulations, for example) extend investor protection beyond the 
buying or selling context. Investors who buy shares become shareholders 
with governance concerns about the entity. For example, when there is a 
specialization of function in these entities, and managers have control over 
large amounts of the investors’ money, there is a gap between the interests 
 
 
 206. See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2413 (2014); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust 
Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1200–01 (2013); see also infra Part IV.B. 
 207. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 2, 5 (12th ed. 2012); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Re-Engineering Corporate Disclosure: 
The Coming Debate over Company Registration, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1143 (1995) (discussing 
informational asymmetries in IPOs and secondary offerings); Sale, supra note 75, at 590–92 (arguing 
that informational asymmetries are at the heart of securities regulation). 
 208. COFFEE & SALE, supra note 207, at 5. 
 209. Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE 
L.J. 977 (1992). 
 210. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, supra note 18, at 138–41. 
 211. Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not 
Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1338–39 (1999). 
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of these two sets of participants. Thus, one of the goals of securities 
regulation is tied to corporate governance, with the idea that a strong 
securities disclosure system can help monitor corporate managers and 
mitigate agency costs.
212
 Securities regulation through mandatory and 
equal disclosure will decrease the monitoring costs that investors face,
213
 
and that, in turn, will help the market to attract capital and improve capital 
allocation.
214
 Here again private class-action litigation aids in enforcement, 
helping to police disclosures and create pressure on the officers and 
directors to be forthright in information provision. Disclosure and 
enforcement that mediate the space between investors and issuers are also, 
in the publicness space, creating a market that attracts issuers, as well as 
the capital of investors more broadly. 
The securities regulatory impulse also supports goals beyond investor 
protection and corporate governance, including market development and 
innovation, as well as economic growth. These goals reflect how 
investors/shareholders share the benefits of regulation along with other 
groups in society. Securities regulations and disclosure, for example, aid in 
price setting and, thus, allocative efficiency.
215
 Capital is scarce, and 
pricing is important to achieving an efficient allocation of it.
216
 The idea is 
that if we calibrate disclosure properly and ensure its evenness, the result 
will be to improve the accuracy of the pricing of securities, where 
accuracy is about pricing that corresponds with the value of the 
companies.
217
 Of course, in economic terms, an efficient allocation of 
capital will allow the issuers to access capital and to grow and, thereby, 
promote economic growth overall, and will redound to the benefit of 
individual investors as well.
218
 Securities regulation can also decrease the 
cost of capital by increasing transparency and diminishing informational 
asymmetries.
219
 As a result, potential shareholders get easier and equal 
access to information, and that, in turn, facilitates investment, again, 
 
 
 212. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 357 (1976); Paul G. Mahoney, 
Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1048–1050 (1995); 
Fox, supra note 203, at 311; see also COFFEE & SALE, supra note 207, at 2. 
 213. Mahoney, supra note 212, at 1048; see also COFFEE & SALE, supra note 207, at 5. 
 214. Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic Performance: The New 
Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 340 (2003); Mahoney, supra note 212, at 1079. 
 215. Merritt B. Fox et al., supra note 214, at 339–340; Fox, supra note 203, at 312. 
 216. Fox et al., supra note 214, at 339.  
 217. Id.  
 218. See Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1887 (2013) 
(arguing that fraudulent financial reporting distorts economic decisions of all firms and misdirects 
labor and capital to subpar projects, thus affecting both the misreporting firm and its rivals). 
 219. COFFEE & SALE, supra note 207, at 6. 
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across companies and the market.
220
 Thus, the benefit of the regulation is a 
public as well as a private one, a form of publicness, and an outcome that 
is a public benefit exceeding the private cost of disclosure.
221
  
Disclosure and allocative efficiency are also important to the 
development and maintenance of a competitive and active capital market, 
and a competitive market, in turn, improves access to capital and promotes 
innovation.
222
 Evidence supports the idea that countries with active 
securities markets have higher levels of economic growth, which, in turn, 
favor innovation and new entrants into the market.
223
 Thus, to the extent 
that disclosure allocates capital and facilitates an active market, it also 
helps to promote growth and innovation—the point of the regulation in the 
first place and another way in which publicness undergirds the goals of the 
regulatory system.
224
  
Even the more specific investor-protection goals with which we started 
have a publicness component. Securities regulation and enforcement both 
facilitate investor confidence more generally, which is vital to belief in the 
market and, thereby, to growth and innovation.
225
 Consider the roots of the 
federal securities laws. The initial set of securities laws arose after the 
1929 stock-market crash and the Great Depression that followed.
226
 There 
was a perception that the Depression may have been prolonged by a lack 
of confidence in the markets.
227
 No one, issuer or shareholder, wants to 
participate in a rigged market.
228
 Thus, regulation to preserve and maintain 
investor confidence helps to build strong and fluid markets.
229
 This need 
for investor protection beyond individual transactions grows as the number 
of market participants grows. With approximately half of the households 
in the United States owning equities either directly or through mutual 
funds or retirement accounts, its importance has increased.
230
 Indeed, 
although investor protection is at the core here, the impulse extends 
beyond the traditional issuer/investor, purchaser/seller context, to a larger 
 
 
 220. See id. 
 221. Id.; see also Fox, supra note 203, at 312–18 (analyzing benefits of public disclosure system); 
Velikonja, supra note 218, at 1929–38.  
 222. J. Robert Brown, Jr., Of Brokers, Banks and the Case for Regulatory Intervention in the 
Russian Securities Markets, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 185, 250–53 (1996). 
 223. See id. at 186.  
 224. COFFEE & SALE, supra note 207, at 8. 
 225. See id. at 5–9.  
 226. See H.R. REP. NO. 73-85 (1933). 
 227. See id. 
 228. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (quoting Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., 
Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)). 
 229. COFFEE & SALE, supra note 207, at 2. 
 230. INVESTMENT CO. INST., EQUITY AND BOND OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA, 2008 1, 6 (2008). 
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concern about markets generally, as well as the deadening effect of crashes 
on growth. This is yet another example of how, as the number of investors 
increases and the concerns about market and economic growth broaden, 
publicness acquires a greater importance in the regulatory scheme.  
In fact, when Congress described the necessity for regulation in the 
1934 Act, its focus was not just investor effects but “[n]ational 
emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment and the 
dislocation of trade, transportation, and industry, . . . and adversely affect 
the general welfare.”231 The national economic collapse that followed the 
financial crisis in 2008, and the Dodd-Frank Act enacted in response to it, 
reflected a similar publicness focus, with the added concerns of systemic 
risk and financial stability.  
These latter concerns are arguably the most robust in terms of 
publicness.
232
 In many financial institutions, securities transactions are 
intertwined with those in adjacent regulatory areas; when one collapses (or 
comes near to collapse), others can as well.
233
 The result, as in 2008, is 
financial instability and systemic risk, and the prescription in Dodd-Frank 
in 2010 was regulatory oversight.
234
 There are many critics of the 
regulatory system and of whether the United States has achieved an 
appropriate regulatory structure and balance;
235
 nevertheless, there is 
general agreement that oversight is necessary to help prevent excessive 
risk taking and the jeopardy to stability that risks can create.
236
 As a result, 
regulation and publicness go hand in hand. 
B. Market-Efficiency Theory, Market Intermediation, Deterrence, and 
Securities Regulation  
The key means to achieving the securities regulatory goals just 
described have been disclosures coupled with effective enforcement of 
those obligations.
237
 The Rule 10b-5 class action is key to the private 
 
 
 231. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (2014); see also Urska Velikonja, Distortion Apart from Price Distortion, 
93 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (discussing the distortions that fraudulent disclosures can 
cause in employment and firms across the market). 
 232. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 18, at 374. 
 233. Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, supra note 18, at 138–39; Langevoort & Thompson, 
supra note 18, at 371.  
 234. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 18, at 374. 
 235. Id. at 373. 
 236. Id. at 373–75. 
 237. Louis Loss’s classic description of securities regulations was “disclosure, again disclosure, 
and still more disclosure.” 1 LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 21 (2d ed. 1961). There are other 
means, of course, including broker-dealer regulation, other limits on the sales process, and internal 
controls, that are left for discussion elsewhere. See COFFEE & SALE, supra note 207, at 54–73. 
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enforcement of those obligations.
238
 We begin this section by exploring the 
role that market efficiency has played in both disclosure and enforcement. 
To do so, we develop the concept of market intermediation, focusing on 
the market as an essential actor and accepted intermediary between issuers 
and investors, both in enforcement and disclosure. The direct contact 
between buyer and seller visible in the structure of the original securities 
laws has given way to a mostly indirect relationship intermediated through 
markets. As a result, investor communication has moved far from its 
original, direct-contact approach, and fraud enforcement has come to focus 
on the collective relationship more than the individual. The result has been 
a reshaping of the expectations about and the theoretical foundations of the 
private cause of action, with market-efficiency concepts playing an 
important role on both the front end and back end of securities regulation.  
In the middle part of this section we set out the hybrid rationale that has 
replaced the compensation theory and is based on deterrence to provide 
the desired enforcement. Deterrence here follows from private class 
actions pursued by investors who have economic losses and Rule 10b-5 
standing, but whose claims are bounded by procedural limits to prevent 
the possibility of over-deterrence through excessive payments to mostly 
diversified claimants. Finally, we argue that the collective focus flowing 
from the market-based intermediation characteristics of today’s securities 
transactions, combined with deterrence enforcement concerns, push the 
traditional investor protection goals of securities regulation much closer to 
the construct of publicness goals we elucidated above. 
Securities disclosure regulations have evolved to reflect, to a much 
greater degree than at their origins, the intermediary role of the market, 
with market efficiency as a proxy just as it is in the class-action context. 
Consider, first, the initial (1933) approach to offering disclosures. 
Required disclosures had to be complete and distinct from any other 
disclosure regardless of issuer size. Documents had to be placed into the 
hands of potential and actual investors.
239
 Today, the integrated disclosure 
system means that information required by the 1933 Act can be met by 
disclosures pursuant to the 1934 Act, and these disclosures no longer need 
 
 
 238. Public enforcement has been a topic of increased recent attention that is not our focus here. 
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 
302–06 (2007). 
 239. Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 205, at 1575 (describing purposes of American 
securities regulation). 
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to be provided directly to prospective purchasers.
240
 One of the key aspects 
of the integrated disclosure reforms is the Form S-3, the filing required for 
equity issuances by large issuers like Halliburton.
241
 Form S-3 greatly 
abbreviated the disclosures required for offerings by eligible filers, 
allowing them to incorporate prior filings by reference.
242
 The idea here is 
that those companies are heavily traded, and followed, and release 
considerable information that is impounded into stock prices and into the 
market on a regular basis.
243
  
The SEC’s adopting release for the integrated-disclosure regulations 
specifically cited the efficient-market theory in support of its deregulatory 
changes.
244
 The release, in fact, went even further, stating that the “market 
operates efficiently for” S-3 companies,245 and disclosures from the 
companies are “disseminated and accounted for by the market place.”246 
This is an information-impoundment theory of market efficiency. The 
explicit reliance on the efficient-market theory, even if overstated,
247
 lends 
support to our theory that belief in some measure of market efficiency 
through information impoundment, and the correlative innovation and 
growth, is both a front-end and a back-end aspect of securities regulation 
and, arguably, important to the publicness aspect of the market.
248
 
The SEC’s reliance on market efficiency in propounding this rule 
change is important for another reason as well. It reveals industry’s 
reliance on market intermediation. The SEC adopted this rule change in 
response to deregulatory pressure, and reliance on the theory of market 
 
 
 240. Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380 (Mar. 16, 1982); Jeffrey N. 
Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 810–12 (1985). 
 241. Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,381; see also Henry T.C. Hu, 
Efficient Markets and the Law: A Predictable Past and an Uncertain Future, 4 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 
179, 184 (2012). 
 242. Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,392. 
 243. Reproposal of Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration of Securities Offerings, 
46 Fed. Reg. 41,902, 41,905 (Aug. 18, 1981). 
 244. See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,382; see also Langevoort, 
supra note 51, at 876.  
 245. Reproposal of Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration of Securities Offerings, 
46 Fed. Reg. at 41,904. 
 246. Id.  
 247. See Langevoort, supra note 51, at 876 (asserting that “it is clear that the adoption of Form S-
3 rests very weakly—if at all—on the efficient market hypothesis”); see also id. at 877 (describing the 
SEC’s reliance on the efficient-market hypothesis as “largely unnecessary”). 
 248. Id. at 873–81 (critiquing the SEC’s reliance as misplaced and critiquing “legal” 
understandings of market efficiency more generally). 
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efficiency helped to justify a pro-industry change.
249
 As a result, integrated 
disclosure became a cost-savings measure for issuers and is now an 
ingrained aspect of our regulatory system. Thus, for the issuers who rely 
on this front-end, market-intermediation measure, it is arguably 
disingenuous to claim a lack of similar intermediation on the back end, 
when deterrence and enforcement—and belief in the market—are at 
stake.
250
  
Form S-3 and integrated disclosure are not the only places where 
market intermediation plays a front-end, offering-based role. Consider 
Rule 415 for shelf offerings.
251
 This Rule is also part of the integration 
reforms, and here, too, the SEC referred explicitly to market efficiency in 
its adopting release.
252
 This Rule allows issuers to register securities on a 
delayed basis, essentially stating that the issuer plans, at some point when 
the market is favorable, to sell securities, and the continuous disclosure 
regime of the 1934 Act provides the requisite disclosures.
253
 The provision 
increases issuer flexibility and options, as well as increasing cost 
savings.
254
 It, too, was premised on the connection between information 
impoundment and stock prices,
255
 and it is now an ingrained part of the 
regulatory system. 
Similarly, the 2005 offering reforms, which provided fewer restrictions 
on the offering process for publicly-traded companies than for their 
counterparts making their initial public offerings, are also arguably based 
on market intermediation, even if not explicitly.
256
 Thus, the argument 
goes, the informational asymmetries and other investor-protection 
concerns are fewer, and the need for regulatory layers less.
257
 The same 
might also be said of the decision to decrease holding periods for the 
resale of restricted securities of companies making required periodic 
 
 
 249. See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,382; see also Ronald J. 
Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis: It’s Still a Matter of 
Information Costs, 100 VA. L. REV. 313, 373–74 (2014) (arguing that the theory of market efficiency 
“was the intellectual basis for advancing” the deregulatory agenda). 
 250. See Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989) (implicitly recognizing this 
argument when it included S-3 filings as one measure of market efficiency). 
 251. 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (2016). 
 252. Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,382. 
 253. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(1)(x) (Rule 415(a)(1)(x)). 
 254. 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1982); Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, 47 Fed. Reg. at 
11,383–85. 
 255. Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, 47 Fed. Reg. at 11,382. 
 256. See Securities Offering Reform, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722 (Aug. 3, 2005). 
 257. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 55, at 621; see also Langevoort, supra note 51, at 881. 
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disclosures to the market.
258
 As a result, these provisions rely at least 
indirectly on the market-intermediation and the market-efficiency theory. 
Here, too, the idea is that information on these companies is already 
available and a market already exists for their securities.
259
 In short, 
information impoundment, market efficiency, and market intermediation 
loom in the background of many front-end offering regulations and 
reforms.  
To be sure, our understanding of market efficiency, or at least that of 
the finance theorists, has changed since the time of Basic.
260
 We know that 
the assumptions undergirding the theory of market efficiency—complete 
information and rational actors—are more nuanced than some of the initial 
broad presentations of the theory. Information is costly.
261
 Transaction 
costs exist.
262
 Noise plays a role in the markets.
263
 And, people trade in 
securities for many reasons that are not rational.
264
 Nevertheless, our 
reliance on these market theories remains, both on the front-end, offering 
side, and, as Halliburton II made clear, on the back-end, enforcement side.  
The reason for this continued reliance, we believe, is that the goals for 
regulation, both investor-oriented and publicness in nature, as well as the 
need for belief in market efficiency and fairness, are too important to 
discard. As a result, the regulatory system deploys market efficiency to 
elide gaps in theory, to enable both capital raising and deregulation. A 
similar pattern is visible on the deterrence/enforcement side, with 
litigation that supports the goals of securities regulation. Efficiency on the 
front end thus implies efficiency on the back end, an example of the type 
 
 
 258. Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 205, at 1623 (describing purposes of American 
securities regulation). 
 259. See generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 55, at 626; Langevoort, supra note 51. 
 260. Langevoort, supra note 51, at 902–03; see also William T. Allen, Securities Markets as 
Social Products: The Pretty Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 28 J. CORP. L. 551, 553–55 (2003) 
(analyzing the developments in market-efficiency theories since their early impoundment into 
corporate and securities law); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 249 (providing historical analysis of 
growth and use of efficient-capital-markets hypothesis in regulation and litigation). 
 261. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 55, at 552–54; see also Langevoort, supra note 51, at 
852 n.6 (citing Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally 
Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 405 (1980)).  
 262. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 55, at 578; Langevoort, supra note 51, at 870 n.61 
(citing Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, 4 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 19, 20–21 (1990)). 
 263. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 55, at 578; Langevoort, supra note 51, at 871. 
 264. See Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New 
Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 660–61 (2003) (discussing behavioral finance and shifts in the 
understanding about investor rationality); see also generally ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL 
EXUBERANCE (2000) (arguing that prices may not reflect intrinsic value when investor enthusiasm 
plays a role); Langevoort, supra note 51, at 858–65. 
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of second-best theoretical solution that is the nature of the regulatory 
enterprise and litigation more generally.  
Class-action theory has easily adjusted to the widespread acceptance of 
the intermediary role of the market in disclosure and enforcement just 
discussed. But some effects of the growth in the sophistication of markets 
and their participants since the inception of the federal securities laws have 
created additional challenges for theories seeking to explain the class 
action. As discussed in Part II, a compensation theory alone cannot 
support the class-action mechanism as it currently works.
265
 It is widely 
understood that the investors who receive payments receive only a small 
percentage of their alleged losses.
266
 Payments in this context tend to be 
circular, with today’s shareholders paying the settlement costs of harms to 
yesterday’s, with attorneys’ fees reducing the payments.267 In short, 
compensation really does not occur and, as a result, cannot be used as a 
justification for the class-action regime.  
The same, however, cannot be said of deterrence. Indeed, Congress 
reiterated the role of deterrence and the importance of the class action in 
that space when it passed the PSLRA.
268
 The Supreme Court did the same 
in opinions discussed in this Article.
269
 Even if less than “optimal,” 
deterrence, whether actual or perceived, continues to have considerable 
traction in the debates about the class action.
270
 This is true even though it 
is well understood that the lack of payments by individual officers and 
directors, and the role of insurance, likely diminish the specific deterrence 
value of the claims,
271
 and that the specific application of deterrence 
theories lacks the necessary nuance to sustain a general theory.
272
 
 
 
 265. See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text. It also cannot support government 
enforcement. See William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—and Why it 
Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2140–42 (2004); see also COFFEE & SALE, supra note 207, at 1–9. 
 266. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 1487, 1507 (1996). 
 267. Fox, supra note 203, at 303–04, 306.  
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Sean Farhang, Class Actions and the Counterrevolution Against Federal Litigation (Univ. of Pa. Law 
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enforcement aspects of class action mechanism), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2622201. 
 269. See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1200 (2013); Dura 
Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005). 
 270. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 203, at 304, 321; Ramirez, supra note 203, at 724–25. 
 271. See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A 
Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173 (2010). Courts can, of course, do more to manage the 
insurance and other downsides. See generally, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Judges Who Settle, 89 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 377 (2011); Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, How the Merits Matter: Directors’ and Officers’ 
Insurance and Securities Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755 (2009). 
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Many academics have raised these concerns. Professors Jackson and 
Roe describe the conventional academic view of securities litigation as 
“seriously compromised.”273 Professor Fisch presents the academic 
literature as reflecting a “general consensus that the traditional 
justifications for private litigation are deficient, and that the rationale for 
private litigation must be reconsidered.”274 And there have been many 
proposals for what would work better: enhanced government enforcement, 
SEC approval of class actions,
275
 stock exchanges in charge of 
deterrence,
276
 sanctions against managers personally,
277
 or regulation of 
incentives of those who bring suits.
278
 
The Supreme Court is seemingly untroubled by such inconsistencies, 
and Congress has hardly batted an eye toward any of the alternative 
solutions. Instead, what we have is a hybrid private class action with 
elements of deterrence as a form of enforcement and some minimal 
compensation, built on the framework of what has gone before and 
adapted to do justice in the securities-transaction world we have. In short, 
class actions provide shareholders recovery (and attorneys with a share of 
it) for losses after misrepresentations. But they also function as a 
necessary and effective deterrent of misconduct that adversely affects the 
market as a whole. Indeed, the class action has become a known 
commodity in the deterrence arsenal in a way that public enforcement has 
not matched. Now, investors who purchased or sold after a 
misrepresentation, and who meet the elements of Rule 10b-5, have 
standing to bring a cause of action under the holding of Blue Chip 
Stamps,
279
 assuming they have an economic loss meeting the prerequisites 
 
 
of the company. See A.C. Pritchard & Janis P. Sarra, Securities Class Actions Move North: A 
Doctrinal and Empirical Analysis of Securities Class Actions in Canada, 47 ALBERTA L. REV. 881, 
903 (2010). For a broader overview of what a remedial scheme should be, see Easterbrook & Fischel, 
supra note 50, at 639–44 (explaining the challenges of deterrence in secondary-markets fraud, where 
there are matched gains and losses, but leaving room for deterrence-based recovery in a system that 
includes scienter limitations). 
 273. Jackson & Roe, supra note 203, at 209. 
 274. Fisch, supra note 203, at 334 (citing, for example, the work of John Coffee and Don 
Langevoort). 
 275. See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the 
Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 
(2008).  
 276. A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges 
as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 983 (1999). 
 277. Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives “Naked, Homeless and Without 
Wheels”: Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the Debate over Entity Versus Individual 
Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 639–40 (2007).  
 278. Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2009). 
 279.  Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731–32 (1975). 
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of Dura.
280
 Nevertheless, the scienter pleading requirements and other 
provisions of the PSLRA permit the weeding out of many questionable 
suits before discovery and its expense even begin.
281
 Further, the elements 
of materiality and loss causation, even though pushed back to a later time 
in the litigation process, shape anticipated damages for any settlement 
discussions. These changes have combined to diminish, but not eliminate, 
the circularity concerns of the diversified investors—including attorneys’ 
fees and litigation costs—who are potentially on both sides of these cases. 
For these, we are left with a choice: deterrence through litigation, as 
compared to the costs and benefits of other alternatives, including, for 
example, the development of a merits-based, front-end regulatory 
system—a choice the United States has eschewed in favor of disclosure 
and back-end fraud enforcement.
282
  
Finally, this is where our expansion of the theory of the securities 
regulatory impulse to include publicness goals comes into play. The 
reason for the resilience of deterrence and the role it plays, we posit, is that 
it is connected to the goals of investor protection and market regulation 
and to publicness. And, here is where the class action has evolved and 
where our understanding of deterrence must also evolve. We need to 
assure all investors, not just individual ones or even issuer-specific ones, 
that the market is “policed” so that they will be encouraged to invest.283 
Additionally, deterrence matters for those not in the market but impacted 
by crashes and downturns. Enforcement and deterrence thus go hand in 
hand. In that sense, then, deterrence, even if not easily measured, 
accomplished, or tied to specific harms, remains vital to the securities 
regulatory goals, including the increasing role of publicness in those goals. 
Securities fraud, if unchecked, creates a market in which no one—not 
offerors, buyers, or sellers—wants to participate. Simply put, fairness, and 
the belief in it, matters to market participants and, thus, to growth and 
innovation. 
 
 
 280.  Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–46 (2005). 
 281. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 50, at 644 (stating that “[t]he interaction of the 
scienter requirement with the damages rule should get rid of excessive (or, what is the same thing, 
inaccurate) enforcement,” but also cautioning that “[i]f the scienter rule does not filter out dubious 
cases . . . then loss-based damages are far too high, and it is necessary to put a more modest remedy in 
their place”). 
 282. The number of lawsuits has stayed relatively constant or declined in the twenty years since 
the PSLRA; the number of lawyers bringing these suits is small, and these suits have not raised the 
level of concern, unlike, for example, merger suits in state court in the last few years or derivative suits 
during the last century. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 203, at 75–76 (pushing for public 
enforcement). 
 283. See Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 345–46. 
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The answer to the application of Halliburton II, and the role of the 
securities class actions more generally, then, lies in our acceptance of the 
need for strong securities markets that help to generate innovation and 
growth. Class actions, as we have argued, play an important role in 
policing and protecting the market and ensuring its strength. The market 
works to allocate capital from investors to users. Issuers rely on the 
market, and indirectly, its efficiency and intermediation, to access capital. 
Capital allocation, in turn, supports growth and innovation, but only when 
belief in the market’s fairness is sustained. The result is that class actions 
have evolved to encompass publicness, and therefore the emphasis on 
specific investor harm/compensation has diminished while the focus on 
deterrence of harm to the market or to a larger class of diversified 
investors has grown.  
Of course, our concerns about fairness, innovation, and growth, as well 
as about information as a public good, support the disclosure, or front-end 
regulatory side we previously discussed.
284
 Importantly, however, they 
also support the back-end enforcement aspect as well—by providing a 
mechanism to deter fraudulent disclosures, which harm the market, and 
belief in it, as a whole. Viewed through the publicness lens, then, class 
actions play not just a direct, investor-protection role, but also a larger role 
in policing and supporting the market, which in turn fuels growth and 
innovation. It is for those reasons, we posit, that the securities-fraud class 
action endures and receives continued support from Congress and the 
Court. Although not free from downsides, the class action is an important 
part of the mechanisms that protect the market and thereby make it 
function as a place that attracts capital, issuers, and investors, which, in 
turn, promotes innovation and growth for investors and citizens alike. In 
short, however messy, the class action arguably endures because:  
1. a strong market is important to growth through innovation and 
capital allocation;  
2. a belief in a “fair” and “efficient” market is a predicate to a 
strong market; and 
3. an enforcement regime, both public and private (class actions), is 
a predicate to a belief in a strong market.   
 
 
 284. See supra Part IV.A. 
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C. The Role of Market Intermediation in Reliance and Price Impact 
As we noted earlier, the Rule 10b-5 class action is a back-end 
enforcement tool that has endured repeated assaults by judges, legislators, 
regulators, practitioners, and academics. Dura, Amgen, and both 
Halliburton cases are recent examples of the Court’s reluctance to make 
wholesale changes to it in the post-PSLRA era. This reluctance is tied to 
both the goals of regulation and the endurance of deterrence and 
enforcement concerns. Yet, like the regulatory goals and the 
accompanying front-end regulatory structure, the class action’s role, as 
well as its shape and requirements, have been shifting over the years. The 
evolving cause of action and the role of the market in that evolution are 
where we turn next. 
1. Market Intermediation and the Evolution of 10b-5 Claims 
The fraud-on-the-market theory generally, and the role of reliance more 
specifically, have both developed along with the securities markets. 
Understanding the evolution of the cause of action requires an 
examination of open-market trading and the role it plays in linking buyers 
and sellers, both with respect to reliance and the measure of damages. 
Given the realities of open-market, anonymous transactions, some aspects 
of the traditional common-law tort of fraud do not, and cannot, directly 
apply. The claims of individual investors, even if made in direct reliance 
on a misstatement, are rarely worth the cost of litigating and therefore are 
not litigated. As previously stated, the class action remedies this 
collective-action problem and plays an important enforcement role.
285
 The 
traditional understanding of reliance, however, was a challenge to the 
development of an effective open-market collective claim. Its role was to 
provide a link between purchasers and misstatements that would address 
concerns about overcompensation and circularity, but it is not subject to 
proof in a traditional common-law manner and, even if it were, would be 
different for each and every person. As a result, it would defeat the 
predominance requirement and, thereby, class certification. Here is where 
the fraud-on-the-market presumption does its work. It facilitates the class 
action and thus provides enforcement and a deterrence check on fraud.
286
 
 
 
 285. See supra Part II.  
 286. Arguably, it also supports the decision not to develop a merits-based regulatory system on the 
front end. See supra note 282 and accompanying text. 
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These are the key core principles the Court reaffirmed in the cases 
discussed in this Article.
287
 Halliburton II made clear that Basic’s 
presumption remains sound. As a group, the opinions reiterate the policy 
reasons undergirding the fraud-on-the-market approach. In short, relying 
on the market as an intermediary for the purposes of the reliance element 
is both necessary and appropriate for open-market transactions.
288
  
To say that the fraud-on-the-market theory is necessary and 
appropriate, however, is insufficient. Its existence means that we have 
already decided that reliance is necessarily different here than in 
traditional fraud cases. Open-market transactions are understandably 
distinct from their common-law counterparts. Market intermediation 
intervenes and leaves us with the question of whether a causal connection 
should be required at all and, if so, what it should look like.  
Consider the development of market intermediation in securities-fraud 
claims. Movement away from the strictures of common law and toward 
recognition of the nature of market-based transactions was occurring in the 
federal courts for more than two decades before Basic.
289
 The Supreme 
Court first relaxed the reliance standard in securities claims in 1970.
290
 
The specific use of fraud on the market in 10b-5 cases was already well 
accepted by the lower federal courts when the Supreme Court embraced 
it.
291
 Academics had also begun to support its adoption. For example, 
Professor Dan Fischel saw fraud on the market as an appealing approach 
to securities fraud and the element of reliance as inconsistent with it.
292
 He 
was later joined in this view by his frequent co-author and now federal 
judge, Frank Easterbrook.
293
 The result was that the requirement of a 
transactional connection between fraudster and plaintiff gave way to a 
market-based adaptation.
294
  
 
 
 287. See supra Part III.  
 288. See Langevoort, supra note 13, at 58–59. 
 289. See, e.g., Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 290. Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970). 
 291. See, e.g., Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir. 1986); Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 
740 (11th Cir. 1984). 
 292. Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving 
Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1 (1982). 
 293. See Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169, 1179–80 (7th Cir. 1987). Professor Margaret Sachs 
has examined Judge Easterbrook’s more restrictive look at the interaction of the merits and procedure 
after his academic writing with Fischel and before his 2010 opinion in Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 
679 (7th Cir. 2010), an opinion that is favorably cited in the Halliburton cases. Margaret V. Sachs, 
Superstar Judges as Entrepreneurs: The Untold Story of Fraud-on-the-Market, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1207, 1233–54 (2015). 
 294. See Fisch, supra note 13, at 913–15.  
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That an adaptation should occur is not surprising—both in light of the 
way that torts have evolved more generally
295
 and the larger goals of 
securities and market regulation discussed earlier. Torts scholars John 
Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky describe how Basic replaced a cause of 
action based on the injury of deceit, or being tricked to buy stock, with one 
based on economic harm resulting from price distortions that follow 
defendant’s misrepresentations—irrespective of reliance.296 This theory 
provides a broader notion of what can count as wrongful injury, where 
reliance is not required, but the cause of action is still legitimate given 
congressional and Court action.
297
 
Within the securities academy, some scholars have argued that the only 
link necessary to satisfy reliance is one to a distortion in market price.
298
 
Others have suggested eliminating reliance entirely.
299
 The focus for the 
securities scholars, as for the torts scholars, is that the investors’ relation to 
the fraud is intermediated through the market.
300
 This difference matters 
because it shifts our focus from the personal to the market and from 
compensation to deterrence, the theory we have described as key to market 
protection in a world of publicness.  
This debate centers on whether the original purpose of reliance, linking 
a defendant’s wrongdoing to a change in behavior of a specific injured 
party, is as important as it once was. The work that reliance does in this 
market-centered circumstance is to prevent misrepresentors from 
becoming insurers to all market purchasers.
301
 The concern lurking behind 
the reliance link is about overcompensation with respect to individual 
purchasers who are now grouped into a class.
302
 Those concerns have, 
however, been addressed in multiple ways. Recall the role of the PSLRA 
 
 
 295. See generally Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 29. 
 296.  Id. 
 297. See id. at 1782–1805. 
 298. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Rethinking Basic, 69 BUS. LAW. 671, 696 (2014). 
 299. See Fischel, supra note 292, at 7–8. 
 300. See Langevoort, supra note 35, at 176 (discussing Basic as providing investors a right to rely 
on undistorted price). 
 301. Eliminating or eliding reliance arguably pushes our understanding of the claim toward one 
about deterrence rather than compensation. See Amanda M. Rose, Fraud on the Market: An Action 
Without a Cause, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 87, 96 (2011). 
 302. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1200–01 (2013). Concerns 
about whether permitting open-market traders, trading with anonymous investors in the market, who 
are neither the defendants nor connected to them other than through trades on distorted prices, creates 
a risk of overcompensation has been the topic of much scholarly literature. See, e.g., Bratton & 
Wachter, supra note 203; Velikonja, supra note 218. The money to pay these investors comes from the 
corporate treasury of the investors’ own company or insurance policies purchased with company 
dollars, which compounds the worry. See Fisch, supra note 203, at 337. 
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in dealing with overcompensation and the perceived strike-suit value of 
these claims. Lead plaintiffs must now receive court approval. Complaints 
must survive stringent pleading standards and are subject to a stay on 
discovery until they do so. Further, plaintiffs must still prove loss 
causation, which provides a connection to the harm, as well as materiality 
and scienter.
303
 Although these reforms have generally been debated in the 
context of strike suits and compensation when no fraud occurred, in fact, 
all of these reforms also help to diminish the likelihood of 
overcompensation through circularity. After all, if we sort good from bad 
claims at the front end of the litigation, and there is evidence that the 
process has improved,
304
 it is reasonable to be less concerned about the 
damages on the back end. That argument is, at least in part, what 
undergirds theories that support the elimination of reliance as an element 
in market-based situations. 
The growth in scholarly literature against reliance in a market-based 
10b-5 claim, along with what we now know was a vigorous debate among 
the justices in the majority in Basic, nevertheless supports a continuing, if 
increasingly limited, role for reliance by providing for the fraud-on-the-
market presumption to be rebuttable.
305
 The majority in Halliburton II 
provides for this rebuttal to be contested at the class-certification point of 
litigation.
306
 Yet, it turns out that in light of the opinions we have analyzed 
in this Article, and the role of the market as intermediary, the rebuttal 
space is appropriately narrowly cabined. 
As a result, the argument about reliance now goes something like this: 
scienter-based, material misrepresentations that distort the market price 
usually give rise to a cause of action, but some are too remote. The three 
examples that the Court provided in Basic
307
 tell us something about what 
was worrying the Court. The first two indicate that the “remote” group 
includes misrepresentations by defendants that are effectively countered 
by other information, either from “market makers” who already know the 
 
 
 303. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014). 
 304. See generally Pritchard & Sale, supra note 72. 
 305. Zipursky and Goldberg also note that Basic does more than create the presumption. See 
generally Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 29. The Court’s theory also allows plaintiffs to use 
circumstantial evidence to support their argument that the defendant’s misstatement distorted the 
market price. It works like this: if the issuer’s securities are traded in an efficient market and a material 
misstatement is made to the public, it can be presumed that the misrepresentation caused a price 
distortion. Id. at 1782–99. 
 306. And the chances of Congress acting to “revisit the entire remedial approach in the fraud-on-
the-market setting, enabling private litigation but making it more clearly a deterrence-based 
mechanism,” are nonexistent in the foreseeable future. See Langevoort, supra note 13, at 59. 
 307.  Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248–49 (1988). 
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correct information or from corrective information that enters the market 
and dissipates the effect of the misstatement.
308
 The third is of a plaintiff 
who knows the defendant’s statement is false but trades anyway because 
of an apparently unrelated motive related to an antitrust problem.
309
 This 
last example illustrates what Goldberg and Zipursky describe as a 
“volenti” concern.310 Virtually every tort deems certain actions by the 
plaintiffs sufficient to limit or foreclose a claim, including consent and 
unjustified reliance. These tort limitations are usually posed as affirmative 
defenses and, in securities fraud, allow for situations in which, even if 
there is a price distortion and the market is efficient, the claim can be 
foreclosed. That type of plaintiff is a “willing” market participant and, 
therefore, not entitled to a remedy.
311
  
Importantly, however, the space covered by these three illustrations has 
shrunk noticeably in the time since Basic—given the precise attention that 
Congress and the Court have paid to possible overcompensation. More 
specifically, the first two examples today would likely be addressed by a 
court under a truth-on-the-market analysis, a materiality question, which, 
after Amgen, we know is not appropriate at class certification.
312
  
Next, recall that in Amgen the Court also emphasized that the class-
action inquiry is a narrow one.
313
 The purpose of the inquiry at 
certification is not to adjudicate the merits of the claim, but to ensure that 
the requisites of Rule 23(b)(3) are met, with the focus largely on whether 
questions common to the class predominate.
314
 The purpose is to 
determine whether a class action is the appropriate method for resolving 
the claim.
315
 Defendants, of course, are motivated to push forward to class 
certification any issue on which they can gain traction. Amgen, however, 
made clear that courts should resist efforts to move what are truly issues 
for trial, or the back end of these cases, to class certification, or the front 
end of these cases.
316
 The failure of courts to do so will defeat the role and 
 
 
 308.  Id. 
 309.  Id. at 249. 
 310. Reflecting the Latin term. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 29, at 1795. 
 311. Basic presents this example in the context of an individual investor, but in the usual class-
action setting it would be relevant for the class as a whole—the defendant would have to show that 
individual issues predominated over common issues on this question. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 
U.S. 224, 249 (1988). 
 312. See, e.g., Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F 2d. 509, 516 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 313.  Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194–95 (2013). 
 314.  Id. 
 315.  Id. 
 316.  Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol93/iss2/13
  
 
 
 
 
2015] PUBLICNESS AND SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS 545 
 
 
 
 
power of certification, create mini-trials and merit creep, and eliminate the 
enforcement aspect of the litigation. 
Halliburton I and Amgen illustrate an additional principle that is 
important to understanding the price-impact evidence as tied to market 
efficiency. In Halliburton I, the Court rejected the defendants’ attempt to 
require proof of loss causation, a Time 2 issue, and proof of materiality, a 
Time 1 issue, at class certification.
317
 In doing so, the Court specifically 
said that proof and these issues were appropriately left to trial.
318
 Yet, the 
Halliburton defendants have now attempted to take the evidence they 
amassed at Time 2/loss causation and deploy it to disprove market 
efficiency at Time 1. If sustained, this argument will eliminate the line 
drawn in Halliburton I and allow market-efficiency fights to be consumed 
with proof on loss causation and debates about materiality. As a result, 
although defendants now have the opportunity to rebut the market-
efficiency presumption at class certification, the space for doing so is, in 
fact, quite small. Indeed, courts must keep in mind that: (1) the defendants 
bear the burden of proof; (2) the inquiry is narrow; and (3) the elements of 
loss causation and materiality cannot be conflated with market efficiency 
either in fact or in proof. The failure to do so will result in a situation in 
which the procedure is allowed to swallow the substance.
319
 
Finally, the third Basic rebuttal issue, the volenti context, presents an 
interesting case. Note that the example in Basic (and also the one that 
Justices Brennan and Blackmun debated in their exchange prior to the 
decision) related to an individual investor. In the typical class context of 
10b-5 litigation, the focus would be on whether such a motivation accrued 
to the class, or perhaps to enough members of the class that a credible 
argument could be made that individual issues would predominate over 
collective ones. A single individual with such a motivation should not, in 
 
 
 317.  Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184–87 (2011). 
 318.  Id. at 2185. 
 319. Early class-certification opinions following Halliburton II are beginning to develop some 
limitations. For example, a Florida trial court ruled that a truth-on-the market defense, which goes to 
materiality, may not be used at the class-certification stage to prove an absence of price impact and 
show a lack of predominance. See Aranaz v. Catalyst Pharm. Partners Inc., 302 F.R.D. 657, 671 (S.D. 
Fla. 2014) (holding that lack of price impact treated as materiality would defeat the arguments of the 
entire class and is better left for trial stage); see also Ganino v. Citizen Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 167 
(2d Cir. 2000) (“[A] misrepresentation is immaterial if the information is already known to the market 
because the misrepresentation cannot then defraud the market.”); Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery & 
Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., No. CV-10-J-2847-S, 2014 WL 6661918, at *1, *9 
(N.D. Ala. Nov. 19, 2014); Fisch, supra note 13, at 928 (“Price distortion is closely related to 
materiality . . . .”). 
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the market-as-intermediary world, block a class, lest the mechanism and 
enforcement power be defeated.
320
 
2. Market Intermediation and Price Impact 
The next step is to take what we know about the market as 
intermediary and reliance and apply it to price impact. The Halliburton I 
Court described price impact as “the effect of a misrepresentation on a 
stock price.”321 Questions about burden of proof and other issues should be 
resolved by reference to the learning about market intermediation in 
securities class actions as reaffirmed in Halliburton II and the other 
Supreme Court cases discussed in this Article. Lower courts have begun to 
do exactly that.
322
 Courts should beware of conflating price impact with 
price movement; otherwise, the lack of price movement will result in a 
finding of lack of price impact, particularly if the price movement analysis 
focuses only on the time of the initial fraud.
323
 Such an approach is over-
inclusive. There are several circumstances in which a price might be 
impacted by a misstatement and not change or not change much, if 
measured at the time of the fraud. Consider the following seven situations, 
only two of which would appropriately be addressed in the price impact 
space defined by Halliburton II. 
1. Misstatement, but allegation that there is not an efficient market 
(for example, not enough analysts following a stock or enough 
liquidity to generate sufficient information for efficient trading). 
 
 
 320. The separate question as to whether the individual plaintiff can be the class representative has 
been carved away by Amgen and Halliburton II. See supra Part III.B. 
 321. Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2187. 
 322. The holding of the Halliburton trial court on remand after Halliburton II seems consistent 
with this narrow space for the rebuttal of the presumption, but still leaves room for additional litigation 
based on dueling event studies. The trial court measured the absence of price impact at the time of the 
correction, not the time of the misrepresentation, and it placed the burden of proof on the defendant to 
prove the lack of price impact. It then certified the class as to one of the asbestos misrepresentations 
when the company’s price had dropped 40%, but found the defendants had rebutted the presumption 
on five other dates. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. 251, 255 (N.D. Tex. 
2015) (relying in substantial part on Fox, supra note 63); see also sources cited supra note 319. 
 323. The Halliburton defendants argued for visible and statistically significant price movement 
both when they were asserting that plaintiffs must prove price impact and later in seeking to rebut the 
presumption. See Defendants’ Brief on Price Impact Demonstrating that Class Certification Must Be 
Denied at 2, Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. 251 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (No. 3:02-
CV-1152-M), 2014 WL 4473340 (“If the ‘stock price did not increase’ following the alleged 
misrepresentation, that is evidence of no price impact.”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, 
Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011) (No. 09-1403), 2011 WL 1541295 (“All they had to do was 
show one day during that class period statistically significant price movement, and they’re in.”). 
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This situation is specifically covered by footnote 27 of Basic and 
would seem appropriate for resolution at class certification. 
2. Misstatement, but allegation that there was no publicity of the 
misstatement—even where there is an efficient market for the stock. 
This is specially covered by footnote 27 of Basic and would seem 
appropriate for resolution at class certification. 
3. Misstatement, but allegation that it was not material. This is also 
listed in footnote 27 of Basic, but given the holding of Amgen, 
would not be appropriate for resolution at class certification. 
4. Misstatement, but defendant is not able to prove statistically 
significant price impact so as to satisfy event study methodology 
regularly used in modern securities class actions.
324
 Given the 
holding of Halliburton II, this context would not be appropriate for 
resolution at class certification. 
5. Misstatement, but the only price impact is attributable to an 
alternative or intervening cause. Given the holding of Halliburton I, 
this would not be appropriate for resolution at class certification. 
6. Misstatement, but the defendant contests it. This would be 
resolved at motion to dismiss, and, if not, at trial per Amgen.  
7. Misstatement, but in context of price maintenance (i.e., 
allegation the misstatement sought to prop up price in the face of 
new information that would have led to decline). This is not raised 
in footnote 27, nor Halliburton II, but the recent Supreme Court 
cases evidence this fact pattern, and lower courts have upheld 10b-5 
claims in price maintenance cases without price movement at 
Time 1. 
This series of fact patterns illustrates two outcomes as to price impact. 
First, the effect of the misrepresentation may sometimes occur even 
though the price itself does not move at the time of the misrepresentation. 
The result is that rebuttal of the presumption would not be appropriate. 
Second, class certification cannot, and should not, resolve all issues in 
which there is no effect of the misrepresentation on price.  
 
 
 324. See Fox, supra note 63 (discussing two measures that might be used by courts to determine if 
the presumption has been rebutted: the first would leave defendants about where they were before 
Halliburton II, and the second would advance the essential issue of loss causation to the class 
certification point of litigation). 
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The Halliburton facts illustrate the former, which is example 7, even 
though the Court itself did not address the issue. In Halliburton, the 
plaintiffs’ initial allegations fell into three categories: asbestos litigation 
liability, construction contract revenues, and merger cost savings.
325
 With 
respect to all of the statements, the plaintiffs’ claim, whether understating 
liability or overstating revenues and cost savings, was that the defendants 
had made the misstatements in order to prevent the market price from 
dropping.
326
 For example, the allegation with respect to the asbestos 
litigation was that if the issuer had been truthful about the extent of its 
liability, which turned out to be much higher than publicly stated at Time 
1, the stock price would have dropped.
327
 The same is true about the 
revenue-recognition allegation on the construction contracts, where the 
plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had overstated the revenue and later 
had to correct it, as well as with respect to the announced cost savings 
from the merger that were unrealistic.
328
 These arguments all depend on 
information impoundment and market intermediation, but in the price 
maintenance context.
329
  
Notice that the structure we have developed so far leaves us with the 
problem that misrepresentations, scienter, materiality, and market 
efficiency are tied to Time 1, but fraud visibility and damages generally 
occur at Time 2. Thus, the liability, construction revenue, and merger 
misrepresentations all occur at Time 1 points, but because the purpose of 
these announcements is, through market intermediation, to prevent the 
price of the company’s stock from falling, it is possible for them to distort 
the price of the stock (or have a price impact) with little or no movement 
in the stock price.  
This pattern is the essence of price maintenance, and the argument, 
price impact without price movement, was also made in Dura and Amgen, 
and is not susceptible to Time 1 price-movement proof. Additionally, 
 
 
 325.  Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2405–06. 
 326.  Id. 
 327.  See id. 
 328.  See id. 
 329. The same is arguably true of Dura and Amgen. The Dura plaintiffs argued that the 
defendants repeatedly made statements about expected sales and profits, as well as impending drug 
approval, despite knowing that neither the profits nor the drug approval were likely, including 
statements about the continued development of the drugs and progress of drug trials. See Fourth 
Consolidated Amended Complaint for Violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 at 1–22, In re 
Dura Pharms., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 99-CV-0151-L(WMC) (S.D. Cal. July 21, 2006), 2006 WL 
3267513. In Amgen, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants continued to make statements about the 
safety of certain drugs despite growing evidence to the contrary. See Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds 
v. Amgen, Inc., No. CV 07-2536 PSG (PLAx), 2009 WL 2633743, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2009). 
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price-maintenance situations reveal that it is possible to have an efficient 
market that shows little or no movement at Time 1 because the distortion 
occurred through price stabilization. In short, price distortions can exist 
without price movement. As a result, judicial decisionmaking as to class 
certification and fights about price impact should reflect an understanding 
of the types of situations that can occur, the narrowness of the allowed 
inquiry, and the maintenance issue.
330
 
Amgen, Halliburton II, and illustration number 4 above also reveal 
another possibility: there are cases where the price does not move, but the 
issue should not be resolved at class certification because it does not go to 
the core class question of whether individual issues predominate. The 
majority opinion in Halliburton II acknowledges via an example that there 
remains something of a failsafe where the connection of a class of 
plaintiffs is so insufficiently tied to the alleged fraud that the remnants of 
reliance might be used to end even an open market fraud case (as opposed 
to scienter or misrepresentation issues resolved on motion to dismiss or 
loss causation and materiality resolved at other points in litigation).
331
 This 
example seemingly intrudes at least partly on the space occupied by 
materiality, but the overlap does not seem to be large. Justice Ginsburg, 
author of the Court’s Amgen materiality opinion just the term before, 
concurs in the Halliburton II majority, briefly noting that it “should 
impose no heavy toll on securities-fraud plaintiffs with tenable claims.”332 
The two opinions illustrate our argument that the space available to contest 
efficiency is, in fact, quite small and is supported both by the publicness 
goals of securities regulation and by the front-end uses of market 
efficiency to justify deregulation. 
In short, reliance and the efficient-market presumption, as well as the 
narrowness of the rebuttal space for price impact, are supported by a more 
general understanding of market intermediation and the role it plays in 
supporting issuers’ access to the capital markets. A key prerequisite for the 
presumption of reliance is the existence of an efficient market. In 
 
 
 330. Many courts have recognized the effect of maintenance, even if the Supreme Court has not 
yet done so. See, e.g., FindWhat Investor Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(stating that fraudulent misstatements that prolong inflation can be just as harmful); McIntire v. China 
MediaExpress Holdings, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 415, 431–35 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); IBEW Local 98 Pension 
Fund v. Best Buy Co., 958 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D. Minn. 2013); In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., 936 F. 
Supp. 2d 252, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 331. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2415–16 (2014). 
 332. Id. at 2417 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). The two views on the causal link that reliance requires 
may be no further apart than the views of Justices Brennan and Blackmun on the same point in their 
exchange of memoranda in Basic discussed above. See supra notes 157–59 and accompanying text.   
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Halliburton II, the defendants argued that a lack of price movement 
revealed the market was not efficient, and thus the presumption was 
rebutted.
333
 Of course, this argument fails to account for price 
maintenance.  
Moreover, if we step back from the econometric studies and consider 
Halliburton’s place in the securities market, it raises the question of 
whether it passes the straight-face test for a Fortune 500, New York Stock 
Exchange-traded company to claim that the market for its stock lacks 
efficiency. Indeed, it is arguably disingenuous for companies who are 
Form S-3 filers, like Halliburton, to take the front-end, registration-side 
advantages of market intermediation but deny the enforcement side of it 
on the back end.
334
 
This is the point at which our construct of the regulatory goals as being 
motivated by publicness, along with market intermediation, provides 
traction. The answer to the specific application of Halliburton II, as well 
as the larger role of the class action more generally, lies in our acceptance 
of the need for strong securities markets. Class actions, as we have argued, 
are important for policing and protecting the market and ensuring belief in 
its strength. This is their enforcement and deterrence role, and that role, in 
turn, contributes to the belief in the market that attracts capital and creates 
stability. The market, of course, works to allocate capital from investors to 
user. Issuers rely on the market, its intermediation, and its efficiency, to 
access that capital. Capital allocation, in turn, supports growth and 
innovation. Market intermediation also plays a role in access to capital and 
offerings, and in deterrence, by providing the necessary reliance bridge for 
predominance, a requirement for a securities class action. These reasons, 
in combination with the case law, support our conclusion that although 
market-efficiency inquiries are allowed at the class-certification stage of 
the procedure, the inquiry is to be a narrow one that does not conflate loss 
causation or materiality with market efficiency and is mindful of price 
maintenance. Insisting on these limitations will help to avoid merit creep 
and mini trials. It will also help to ensure the market protection essential to 
innovation and growth.  
 
 
 333.  Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2409–10. 
 334. See Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1285 (D.N.J. 1989) (implicitly recognizing this 
argument by including S-3 filings as one measure of market efficiency). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article develops the role that market intermediation plays in 
securities regulation—both on the front and back end. On the back end, its 
role reflects both concerns about the possibility of overcompensation and 
the place that enforcement plays in ensuring belief in strong securities 
markets.
335
 The front-end regulatory examples reveal how market 
intermediation facilitates capital formation and deregulation.
336
 Here, for 
example, it replaces other options, including a merits-based regulatory 
system. On the back end, through litigation and deterrence, market 
intermediation resolves collective-action problems through the class 
action. In short, the market-efficiency theory has withstood the test of time 
for the same reasons that industry has deployed it on the front end: 
because it is “a reasonable approximation of the truth” that both enables 
rulemaking and capital raising as well as class-action policing of open-
market fraud.
337
  
In sum, the securities-fraud class action has evolved and endured 
because of the role it plays in enforcement and the publicness of the 
markets. It does so through, at least in part, market intermediation. As we 
explored, the market plays a part as an intermediary and enables securities 
regulation on the front end and, through deterrence/enforcement, on the 
back end. Thus, efficiency and intermediation on the front end correlates 
with efficiency and intermediation on the back end. In today’s world, 
open-market cases are different from their common-law counterparts, and 
the Basic presumption recognizes that difference. It allows these cases to 
proceed and to fulfill their enforcement role. Further, the class action as 
modified by the courts and Congress balances concerns about 
overcompensation with those about unchecked fraud and, in doing so, 
makes its own contribution to market efficiency. Congress chose the 
elements that should be addressed at the motion to dismiss stage and those 
that belong to the merits stage, resulting in a very stringent inquiry that 
itself verges on a dispute about the merits. Class certification is not 
designed to be, and should not be, the same. It should not become the 
driver, because if it does, procedure, and the Court’s increased willingness 
 
 
 335. It is also the product of cost-benefit analysis. See Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, 
and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711 (1996); Langevoort, supra note 
51. 
 336. Not all S-3 filers, for example, are free of fraud or necessarily good candidates for shelf 
offerings, but all of them can use the provision because it is more cost effective to regulate in that 
fashion. 
 337. Allen, supra note 260, at 559. 
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to indulge in it, will continue to result in added costs and layers of 
litigation with very little pay off to the litigants, the markets, or the public. 
Although this means that some cases that survive and settle will have 
merit and some will not, that is the way the litigation system works. 
Indeed, viewed in that light, market intermediation, publicness, and the 
securities class action combine to yield the type of second-best theoretical 
solution that is the nature of the regulatory enterprise and litigation more 
generally. 
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